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ABSTRACT 
REMEMBERING THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: REFLECTIONS ON MEMORY, 
HISTORY AND REPUBLICANISM IN FRANCE 
 
FEBRUARY 2011 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Jennifer N. Heuer. 
 
Within the past few years, France has exhibited a changing relationship in regards 
to its traumatic memory of its collaborationist and colonial past. The controversies of the  
loi du 23 février 2005 and the 2007 Guy Môquet Commemoration displayed a new 
openness to discuss and evaluate traumatic pasts associated with these two public acts. 
Public debate during the two controversies focused on the difficult process of how to 
incorporate these traumatic events into the national narrative. Furthermore, this process of 
negotiation has opened up a vibrant discussion over what parties in France possess the 
authority and the right to construct the nation’s history. Medical metaphors of neurosis 
and repression no longer appear to fit French practices of commemoration and 
remembrance.  
The Fifth Republic’s legislative effort to dictate the content and character of 
France’s past encountered significant resistance from a number of historians and 
educators. These scholars criticized the inappropriate character of the French State’s 
involvement in the writing of history. While they stood opposed to the State’s methods, 
French historians and scholars came to frame their resistance to legislated history as 
evidence of their loyalty to republican ideals, namely those of scientific inquiry and 
laïcité. They too desired the creation of a shared national history, yet insisted that this 
 vii 
history could only be formed by respecting the presence of multiple narratives. Other 
scholars voiced their reservations that the restoration of traumatic narratives might further 
social breakdown. Interestingly, historians expressed little concern for the role of the 
general public in the writing of history and, at times, revealed a distinct apathy or active 
mistrust of the public’s capacity to think historically.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A. A Shrug And Silence: My First Encounter With Contested French Memory  
From 2007 to 2008, I spent my time teaching at the lycée Évariste Galois in 
Sartrouville under the auspices of a Fulbright English Teaching Assistantship. I had been 
at the school only a few weeks before I encountered an unsettling scene in teacher’s 
faculty lounge. I remember the agitated buzz that permeated the room and being taken 
aback by the unusual tension that permeated a space that normally exuded relaxation, 
relief, and fatigue. I made my way to the vending machine and, as I keyed in my order, 
my eyes drifted to a piece of paper that had been taped to the front of a nearby machine. 
This letter urged the faculty to refuse participation in President Nicolas Sarkozy’s planned 
reading of the letter written by Guy Môquet to French students and to protest this 
intolerable “instrumentalization” of the national past. My curiosity compelled me to ask 
one of my colleagues to what the letter was referring. She hastily explained that Guy 
Môquet was a young French communist who had been arrested and later executed by the 
Germans during the Occupation. The letter stirring up such controversy, she said, was 
simply the letter he had written to his family on the eve of his execution. My friend 
punctuated her explanation with an uninterested shrug. She had no reservations about 
reading Môquet’s letter to her students and, regardless of the opinions of her peers, she 
intended to do so. With a curious air of ambivalence, apathy, and resignation, she ended 
our conversation. 
 My colleague’s ambivalence towards the Guy Môquet’s commemoration appeared 
somewhat odd in contrast to its fierce and eclectic body of opposition. The French 
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Communist Party and Socialist Party, once reservedly enthusiastic supporters of the 
event, now accused President Nicolas Sarkozy of transforming Môquet into a kitschy 
allegory of French patriotism and republican loyalty. Many French historians and 
educators bristled at the perceived violation of their professional realm. Professional 
concerns quickly translated into political anxieties. These historians and educators issued 
a grave warning that the government’s repeated intrusion into historical affairs, 
particularly in the classroom, contributed to a disturbing deterioration of historical 
knowledge in France. Some, like Laurence De Cock-Pierre, denounced the Môquet 
commemoration for being motivated by a dangerous chauvinism that sought to harness 
the national past to transmit a political ideology to the public.1  
B. A Guerre mémorielle franco-française? 
 At first, I wrote off the controversy surrounding the Môquet commemoration as 
only the product of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s election. The president’s tumultuous 
political history and public resistance to his proposed economic and social reforms 
appeared responsible for the politicized character of this event. It would not be until my 
entry into the graduate program at the University of Massachusetts Amherst that I began 
to connect the Môquet commemoration to the broader context of negotiating with 
traumatic pasts in the national narrative. Professor Jon Berndt Olsen’s course on the 
memory of World War II introduced me, to adapt Henry Rousso’s phrase, the guerre 
mémorielle franco-française (France’s memory war). Since that course in Spring 2009, 
my understanding of this memory war broadened to include the violent and painful era of 
the French empire’s collapse, especially in regard to the loss of Algeria. The collective 
                                                 
1
 Laurence De Cock-Pierrepont. “Des usages étatiques de la lettre de Guy Môquet,” Site du 
CVUH, May 2007. http://cvuh.free.fr/spip.php?article94 (Accessed April 26, 2010). 
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traumas of the Occupation and decolonization have made the Republic’s legislative 
efforts to arrive at a shared vision of the French national past difficult, if not impossible.  
These efforts by the French Republic recently came to an anti-climatic resolution. 
On November 19, 2008, the parliamentary committee led by Bernard Accoyer issued a 
report that recommended that the National Assembly put an end to the legislative practice 
of the loi mémorielle, a category of French law that established the State’s official 
position on historical matters and outlined the consequences for challenging or 
transgressing this vision of history. The committee proclaimed that the National Assembly 
ultimately lacked the juridical authority to pass laws which established or endorsed 
particular interpretations of the national past, elaborating that such laws inhibited the 
freedom of expression necessary for historical research and democratic society.2 
However, the committee’s conclusions did not indicate a renunciation of the Republic’s 
interest in issues of national history or the commemoration of the past. In fact, the 
committee’s report went to great lengths to detail the substantial republican tradition of 
public commemoration and education in matters of history.3 At its heart, the Accoyer 
Report reaffirmed the long-held republican assumption that the past represented an 
integral method of maintaining and perpetuating a democratic society. The construction 
and transmission of this common history remained of interest to the French Republic, 
even if public opinion forced it to abandon certain methods of acting on that interest.  
 
                                                 
2
 Accoyer Commission. Rapport d’Information Fait en Application de l’Article 145 de Réglement 
au Nom de la Mission d’Information sur les Questions Memorielles. Assemblée Nationale, November 18, 
2008. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i1262.asp (Accessed April 26, 2010). 
  
3
 Rapport d’Information Fait en Application de l’Article 145 de Réglement au Nom de la Mission 
d’Information sur les Questions Memorielles. 
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What had motivated public opinion to condemn the Republic’s efforts to legislate 
a shared history for its citizens? Growing State involvement in the dictation of historical 
curriculum in French schools provoked considerable outcry from French historians and 
educators. However, the Republic’s interest in the classroom is unsurprising. After all, the 
Accoyer Report identified the historical education offered at French écoles as “…one of 
the cements of national unity.”4 The committee particularly emphasized the role of 
diversity in the national past, which would act to remind citizens that all were gathered 
together and united under the Republic.5 In short, republican society would be bound 
together by a synthesized collective of multiple histories. Ironically, the report’s 
description of the multi-faceted character of France’s national past overlooked the fact 
that it was the same troubling diversity that had compelled the Republic to both institute 
and later review the use of lois mémorielles. In spite of its willingness to cease certain 
practices, the Accoyer Report demonstrated that French legislators refused to alter or 
abandon their concept of history as a socially unifying force.  
How to explain this renewed enthusiasm for a shared history? Why did legislation 
that dealt with the national past appear to have such tremendously high stakes? Social and 
economic transformations taking place in French society around the turn of the twenty-
first century likely turned France’s attention to its national past for reassurance and 
counsel. Economic hardship, high unemployment, and racial discrimination lingering 
from the colonial era provoked occasional episodes of protest and violence by French 
                                                 
4Rapport d’Information Fait en Application de l’Article 145 de Réglement au Nom de la Mission 
d’Information sur les Questions Memorielles. 
 
5
 Rapport d’Information Fait en Application de l’Article 145 de Réglement au Nom de la Mission 
d’Information sur les Questions Memorielles. 
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youth, culminating in the Parisian banlieues riots that gradually spread across the nation 
in late 2005. Reservation over the Republic’s philosophy of assimilation in regards to 
integrating non-European immigrants into secular French society framed public 
discussion of headscarves and burkas in public spaces. Growing economic, cultural, and 
generational divisions both coincided with and encouraged a tortured effort to make 
amends for national crimes. In 1995, only a few years after François Mitterand's 
unpopular refusal to participate in a previous commemoration of the Vél d'Hiv round-up, 
French President Jacques Chirac officially acknowledged France’s role in the European 
persecution of Jews during Hitler's Final Solution. The belated trials of Vichy 
collaborators Paul Touvier and Maurice Papon brought the traumatic history of Vichy and 
the Occupation back into national consciousness, reopening old national wounds.6 Later, 
in 1999 and 2000, the French Republic finally acknowledged the Algerian War to be more 
than a police action, and some French generals publicly admitted its army’s use of torture. 
The steady deluge of traumatic memories compelled the French State to take legislative 
action to contain and neutralize this potentially divisive force.  
 Not all French accepted the State's campaign to acknowledge and confront the 
nation's troubled past. In fact, some French historians criticized the government and 
general public's apparent fixation on traumatic pasts and attributed to this fixation 
national demoralization and a loss of faith in France's historical mission. According to 
Max Gallo, French historian and intellectual, this legislative initiative only aggravated the 
                                                 
6
 These trials took place over the course of the 1980’s and early 1990’s. For further reading see:   
Henry Rousso. The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944. Trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Richard J. Golsan ed. The Papon Affair: 
Memory and Justice on Trial. (New York: Routledge, 2000); Richard J. Golsan. Vichy’s Aftermath History 
and Counterhistory in Postwar France. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000). 
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social ills that it sought to contain. Public recognition of past crimes through routine 
commemoration allegedly engendered a fierce communitarianisme (multi-culturalism) 
anathema to republican unity. Gallo passionately railed against these trends, writing in 
sarcastic terms that the campaign that aimed to strip France of its rightful place in history:  
Forget the dreams of grandeur! Let’s stop being a country and let’s become a 
gathering of European regions! Away with French exceptionalism! Erase our 
glorious history from our memories! It is criminal. Do not evoke anymore 
Versailles, Valmy, or Austerlitz, but the Code Noir, the roundup of Vél d’Hiv, Dîen 
Bîen Phu and torture! Let’s be a province, Basque or Corsican, Poitevine, 
Savoyard, Vendean or West Indian, and not a nation! Stay rooted in our 
communities and regional traditions. […] Thus, we will live better!7 
 
National unity thus required a shared history that emphasized common ideals and 
experiences. To Gallo, mending the divisions in French society did not demand any 
further recognition of diversity or crimes found in France's history. Rather, national ills 
would be best relieved by a healthy dose of silence and amnesia about these traumatic 
moments in the nation’s history.8  
The desire to forget or silence ambiguous or undesirable memories in favor of an 
idealized past is, to be fair, an understandable impulse. The memories of our past 
commonly become a refuge, a world more stable than the turbulent present. However, 
Gallo’s frustration derived less from an aggrieved nostalgia than the introduction of 
several marginalized histories and memories into the nation’s consciousness. For some, 
the empowerment of these histories became a source of anxiety and discomfort.   
                                                 
7
 Max Gallo. L'Âme de la France: Une histoire de la Nation, des origines à nos jours. (Paris: 
Fayard, 2007), 22. 
 
8
 Professor Jay Winter’s insight and interest in this project brought the role of silence to my 
attention. For those interested in silence and its role in shaping public memory, see: Jay Winter. “The Social 
Construction of Silence.” (Keynote Address, 6th Annual Graduate History Association Conference, 
Amherst, March 27, 2010). 
 7 
The examination of the lois mémorielles’ apex from 2004 to 2007 demonstrates 
that the tension over these laws’ existence derived from the national debate over how and 
where to introduce these traumatic histories. The Loi française n° 2005-158 du 23 février 
2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des 
Français rapatriés unleashed the energies that had been simmering since the early 1990s. 
Although Minister of Veteran's Affairs Hamlaoui Mekachéra had proposed the law in 
mid-2004 to recognize former colonists and colonial subjects, tensions boiled over when 
conservative legislators introduced an amendment designed to emphasize the "rôle 
positif"9  of French colonization in the classroom. This provoked French historians and 
educators to issue a condemnation of the government’s intrusion into the classroom. Later 
that year, two advocacy groups organized to monitor and protest the “politicization” of 
French history and defend academic autonomy and scholarship; the Comité de vigilance 
contre l'usage public de l'histoire (CVUH) and Liberté pour l'histoire (LpH).  These two 
organizations would later be vocal opponents of President Nicolas Sarkozy's 
commemoration of Guy Môquet. These two confrontations between the Republic and its 
scholars provide a rich array of events to explore these interrelated issues of contested 
memory, which public bodies or communities possess the authority to shape those 
memories into historical narratives, and what form and use these new histories have in 
democratic society. Furthermore, they raise important questions about the Republic’s 
obligation to remember its past and, more important, its right to lay the past to rest.  
 
                                                 
9
 French National Assembly. LOI n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la 
Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés. Legifrance, February 23, 2005. 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=B683D839F254DD66CC979A93B54A95E4.tpdjo
11v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000444898&categorieLien=id (Accessed April 29, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 2 
MEMORY, HISTORY, AND EDUCATION: A REPUBLICAN TRINITY 
A. Defining Memory and Its Relationship to History 
 Before beginning our discussion of these two controversies, I first need to provide 
a definition of memory and how it is relevant for modern French society. What exactly is 
memory? How do individuals and societies recall their past experiences, construct them 
into a defined narrative, and express and transmit that narrative to other parties? What 
role has memory played in making and maintaining national communities? These 
questions have received a considerable amount of scholarly attention in recent decades. 
The end of social history’s dominance in the 1980’s paved the way for a generation of 
cultural historians to interact with historical artifacts in new ways to determine how 
individuals conceptualized and interpreted their contemporary circumstances, culture, 
social values, etc.10 This increasingly popular study of mentalités made possible the 
expansion of the historian’s ensemble of artifacts acceptable for research.11 Cultural 
historians eagerly fixed their attention on literature, public speeches, theater, art, 
architecture, legal documents, and public monuments in their efforts to study and 
reconstruct the past. This atmosphere nurtured methodological innovation and contributed 
to the new interest in memory. Paul Fussell’s analysis of the memory and representation 
                                                 
10
 William Sewell provides an informative and intimate overview of this methodological 
transformation in academic history in “The Political Unconscious of Social and Cultural History, or, 
Confessions of a Former Quantitative Historian” in Logics of History: Social Theory and Social 
Transformation. (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2005), 22-80.  
 
11
 Alon Confino discusses the connection between the history of mentalités and memory, 
particularly in regards to its methodological similarities and hazards in Germany as a Culture of 
Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History. (Chapel Hill: University Of North Carolina Press, 
2006), 171-172.  
 9 
of trench warfare in literature published during and after World War I in The Great War 
and Modern Memory marked an early breakthrough in the field of memory studies.12 
Memory studies later expanded outside the boundaries of literary analysis and examined 
the role of objects as the receptacles of human memory, namely physical monuments, 
symbols, allegorical figures, film, etc.13 To be fair, credit for the development of memory 
studies does not lie with cultural historians alone. Public history’s “democratization” of 
history, particularly in bringing scholarly respectability to oral history, made memory an 
acceptable subject of study.14 This tentative cession of scholarly authority to the general 
public has done much to give individual and communal memory more space and 
influence in scholarship.   
 A satisfactory definition of memory still proves to be a difficult task for 
historians. At its core, memory is a distinctly human trait, an intimate and elusive 
possession of the individual. This memory appears to be an agglomeration of 
recollections of past events, thoughts, ideas, and feelings, all interwoven together in an 
intangible tapestry. These recollections possess a variety of uses and functions. For 
example, memory can provide the individual valuable guidance for making decisions in 
the present by offering comparable situations or indicating the previous outcomes of 
                                                 
12
 Paul Fussel. The Great War and Modern Memory. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
 
13
 Examples of this genre of study that deal with the role of material culture and memory include: 
Pierre Nora. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. Lawrence D. Kritzman ed. Trans. Author 
Goldhammer. 4 Vol. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996-1998); Rudy Kosher, From Monuments 
to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990. Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism. 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2000), James Young, The Texture of 
Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993).   
 
14
 Exemplary studies in oral history and memory include Allesandro Portelli. The Death of Luigi 
Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History. SUNY Series in Oral and Public History. 
(Albany: State University Press of New York, 1991); Michael Frisch. Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft 
and Meaning of Oral and Public History. (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1990). 
 10 
similar choices. It can offer us solace during moments of grief or loss through figurative 
restoration of the departed. They even give us the pleasant diversion of nostalgic 
reflection. In short, memory and the capacity for the recollection of the past represent an 
integral component of human existence.  
In spite of memory’s prominence in the human experience, historians have 
traditionally expressed reticence, if not outright refusal, to engage with it in their studies. 
Scholarly trepidation reveals a particular anxiety over memory’s fluid and inventive 
character. Paul Ricoeur noted that this attitude stemmed from the belief that “…memory 
is the province of the imagination.”15 There is, to be sure, some truth to that belief. Take 
into consideration the memoir. The author writes his memoirs in a literal effort to 
construct a physical object that will act as a receptacle for the sum of his recollections and 
endure the demise of his earthly vehicle. Still, this artifact ultimately suffers from two 
major complications. First of all, any written record of memory lacks the precision of 
language necessary to describe and encapsulate the entirety of human experience. 
Standardized language subtly frames and limits the expression of memory, an important 
point to which I will return later. Secondly, the memoir’s text is a narrative built in the 
framework of the author’s contemporary circumstances and biases, which reflect the 
pressures of outside social forces.16 These factors influence the content of the author’s 
working, determining what experiences and thoughts are recollected and recorded. For 
                                                 
15
 Paul Ricoeur. Memory, History, Forgetting. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. 
(Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 5. 
 
16
 Paul Connerton  notes how political and cultural elites tend to frame their memoirs in the 
framework of a broader historical narrative. However, he neglects to discuss how that influences the content 
of their memoirs. For further reading see: Connerton, Paul. How Societies Remember. Themes in the Social 
Sciences. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 19. .    
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example, they may encourage him to censor certain inappropriate or unacceptable actions 
or thoughts in order to avoid social derision. Inversely, they might lead him to emphasize 
socially acceptable thoughts or behaviors to win his audience’s approval. Furthermore, 
the author of the memoir typically constructs his narrative with the aim of transmitting 
morals or valuable instruction to his audience.17 This too establishes a narrative structure 
that recollects and discards particular experiences or thoughts in order to achieve the 
narrative’s goal. This propensity for censorship, alteration, or outright fabrication runs 
contrary, says Ricoeur, to memory’s ambitious claim to truth.18 The slippery character of 
memory’s truthfulness has made it an unsuitable object of study for many historians.  
B. Collective Memory and the Birth of the Modern Nation-State 
Nevertheless, those historians willing to interact with memory insist that, by 
subjecting memory to a dispassionate and scientific examination, one can determine the 
historical truth of its content.19 This critical approach to memory not only allows the 
historian to overcome its inherent inaccuracies and obfuscations; it also enables him to 
evaluate how a society uses the past to explain and justify contemporary circumstances. 
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs elaborated on this process in his groundbreaking 
work, On Collective Memory. According to Halbwachs, the construction of individual 
memory is not an activity free of outside influence. Instead, he proposed that the 
formation and recollection of memories takes place within the social norms established 
                                                 
17
 Jacques Le Goff noted the distinct shift in the historian’s opinion of memoirs and testimonies as 
acceptable sources in: Jacques Le Goff. History and Memory. Trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman. 
European Perspectives. (New York & Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1992), 185-186.  
 
18
 Ricoeur, 7. 
 
19
 For an excellent overview and diatribe of history’s development as a modern science, see Le 
Goff, 179-199. 
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by the communities we inhabit, where we “…recall, recognize, and localize…” our 
memories in conjunction with one another.20 This does not mean that this communal act 
of recollection possesses a coercive character or entails the violent elimination of deviant 
memories. Rather, the act of remembrance depends heavily on the collective effort of 
each individual to recognize and reinforce the shared content of his memories. Halbwachs 
describes this process thusly, saying:    
Most of the time, when I remember, it is others who spur me on; their memory 
comes to the aid of mine and mine relies on theirs…There is no point in seeking 
where they are preserved in my brain or in some nook of my mind to which I 
alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I 
am a part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon condition, to 
be sure, that I turn toward them and adopt, at least for the moment, their way of 
thinking.21  
 
For Halbwachs, memory remains dormant until outside stimuli trigger the need to recall 
past people or events. The fact that these stimuli (people, experiences, objects, ideas) are 
“shared” by many individuals ensures that the recollections would be similar. 
Furthermore, these individuals construct their memories using shared epistemological 
frameworks. Typically, communities have a basic language, social hierarchy, and value 
system in common, which also work to make individual memories remarkably similar in 
content. Regardless of the raw material that constitutes our individual memories, we 
ultimately construct them in such a way that reflects the presence and collective pressures 
of the communities that we inhabit. 
 How exactly does this collective process of recollection work? Does this process 
lead our memories to resemble the historical record? Halbwachs stated that the social 
                                                 
20
 Halbwachs, 38. 
 
21
 Halbwachs, 38. 
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pressures and frameworks inherent in our communities lead to us to “…reconstruct an 
image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the 
society.”22 In short, contemporary concerns and needs have greater influence over how we 
remember the past than the real nature of our past experiences. The involvement of 
contemporary circumstances, cultural mores, values, etc., ensures that particular details 
are emphasized or expunged from memory and that this remembrance of the past would 
conform to the present. In this respect, the past exists as an omni-present entity, 
continuously deconstructed, organized, and remade in the relentless progression of time. 
How exactly is this revision of the past transmitted across communities? 
Halbwachs identified language as the critical social framework for proper collective 
remembrance.23 Verbal and written forms of communication provide our memories with a 
skeleton upon which they can take form. This skeleton, for the lack of a better word, is 
not a neutral participant in this process. Common, standardized languages rely on singular 
definitions agreed upon by its speakers, which consequently bind our memories to those 
definitions. We express our memories in the words of the present, which ensures that we 
reconstitute the past with contemporary ideas, values, assumptions, and judgments. This 
sets the stage for the subconscious alteration of our memories in order to orient them 
within the language of the present. This contributes, like Halbwachs states, to the constant 
process of historical revision that rewrites our past to the contemporary circumstances 
and demands of the present.24  
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While he examined the formation of collective memories in families, religious 
communities, and social classes, Halbwachs neglected to discuss how the nascent 
national communities of nineteenth-century Europe reconstructed and remembered their 
pasts. Unlike past communities, these young nations aimed to subordinate all other forms 
of communal association under themselves. Fervent nationalists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century typically conceived the nation according to Guiseppe Mazzini’s 
definition, who defined the nation as a community of people “…all speaking the same 
language, gifted with the same tendencies, and educated by the same historical 
tradition.”25 In other words, the natural boundaries of a nation could easily be determined 
by the existence of a shared language, culture, and, most importantly, past. How did 
nationalists propose to construct the new national community in the wake of such 
ignorance and distortion? How did they intend to make the nation knowable to the 
unwitting citizen? Mazzini proposed that what the nation needed to do was make itself 
known to the public and undertake an ambitious program of public education, writing: 
Every citizen ought to receive in its (the nation’s) schools moral teaching, a 
course in the history of nationalities, including a rapid survey of the progress of 
Humanity, and in the history of his own country, a popular exposition of the 
principles which direct the legislation of the country, and the elementary 
instruction about which there is no dispute. Every citizen ought to learn in these 
schools equality and love.26 
 
 Proper public education in moral conduct, civil society, and history provided the 
necessary foundation to create a community of citizens capable of participating in a 
democratic nation. Only virtuous citizens fluent in their nation’s language, culture, and 
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government could maintain and perpetuate the national community. In order to 
accomplish this goal, nationalists and their partisans set about constructing and 
transmitting national cultures connected to the past. This involved the resurrection, 
reinvention, and fabrication of previous symbols and rituals in society. Eric Hobsbawm’s 
and Terence Ranger’s edited collection of essays, The Invention of Tradition,27 defined 
these “invented traditions” as  
…a set of practices normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a 
ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”28  
 
These new or rediscovered traditions could be found anywhere: clothing, folklore, 
language, literature, coronations. Other traditions, like the tartan and kilt as a symbol of 
Scottish nationalism, had to be completely fabricated.29 Nascent nation-states needed to 
rely heavily on these “invented traditions” to survive. Hobsbawm demonstrated this point 
in his discussion of the Third Republic of France. French republicans appropriated the 
history of the French Revolution and constructed an entire culture of public 
commemorations and ceremonies, pantheons of heroes, and material objects in order to 
justify their regime.30 The construction of republican France did not consist of the 
“rediscovery” of the republican past alone. Deliberate forgetting or silencing of particular 
memories acted to neutralize potential challenges to the national community and to 
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secure the loyalty of its citizens. As noted by Ernest Renan, the nation is as much about 
forgetting the past as it is remembering that past.31  
How did nationalists successfully transmit and impose their vision of the national 
community on the hearts and minds of their audiences? The reason for this development 
likely has to do with the revolution in Europe’s means of communication. Benedict 
Anderson proposed in his work, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism,32 that the development of nationalism had its roots in print-
capitalism. According to Anderson, Europe’s capability to mass-produce books, 
newspapers, and pamphlets written in a vernacular allowed individuals separated by 
great distances to conceptualize themselves as members of a much broader community 
outside the limits of their village, town, or city.33 Certainly, the rise of literacy rates in 
Europe during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries enabled the mass 
consumption of print-culture necessary for establishing a sense of community among its 
readers. Some scholars, like Adrian Hastings, have criticized this argument for ignoring 
that print had existed and been circulating Europe long before the eighteenth century.34 
Nevertheless, Hastings misses the important point that a means of communication can do 
only so much if a small fraction of the population can understand and use it. The idea of 
the nation may have existed in the minds of Europe’s leaders, but this means very little if 
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the public did not think in such terms. Increasing literacy rates, standardized languages, 
and public education made it possible for the middle-class, working-class, and peasants 
to envision a national community and imagine themselves to be a part of it.  
C. Inventing a Republican France and National Past 
The circumstances surrounding the Third Republic’s establishment reveal an 
energetic campaign by republicans to construct a national community and link its 
existence to the Republic. French republicans, brought into power in the wake of a 
disastrous war against Prussia in 1870, found their Republic threatened by a powerful 
monarchist movement and a divided public. Although the monarchist movement lost 
considerable momentum by the 1880’s and fizzled out by the 1900’s, the Republic still 
needed to secure the allegiance of its citizens. The republicans had a monumental task in 
front of them. Eugen Weber noted in his book, Peasants into French: The Modernization 
of Rural France, 1870-1914,35 that regionalism still frustrated the Third Republic’s desire 
for a citizenry capable of participating in a national democratic society. To republicans, 
regional difference represented “…imperfection, injustice, failure, something to be noted 
and to be remedied.”36 In order to rectify these perceived obstacles to national unity, the 
republicans expanded on past efforts to development domestic infrastructure (roads, 
railroads, and bridges), instituted obligatory military service for all male citizens, and 
implemented an ambitious array of educational reforms and programs. These programs 
would encourage citizens to conceptualize themselves outside of traditional identities of 
village and church and consider themselves as members of a broader national community. 
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This would diminish regional differences and subordinate local loyalties to the Republic 
and the nation.  
Language education proved to be critical in the Third Republic’s efforts to create 
a modern nation. After all, many citizens living in the Third Republic continued to speak 
in local languages, dialects, and patois that distinguished their regional communities from 
each other and barred them from engaging in a national culture. By 1863, about 8,381 
communes out of 37, 510 or nearly a quarter of France spoke a language other than 
French.37 This represented a major obstacle for republican aspirations of national unity. 
According to Weber, regional languages represented a political threat to the integrity of 
the Republic because they interfered with the transmission of information from Paris or 
and participation in the daily workings of democratic society.38 More importantly, I 
believe that these linguistic differences represented an obstacle to the Republic’s goal to 
construct the collective memory necessary for creating and maintaining a national 
community. Communities with different languages or dialects would retain their regional 
distinctiveness and collective memory, preserving regional identity and loyalties that 
could oppose the Republic.    
Schools acted as the space in which the Republic could neutralize local dialects 
and integrate these communities into the national fold, largely in part of Jules Ferry’s 
reforms that made primary education free, universal, and mandatory for all French 
children. Furthermore, republicans in Paris secured the school as a republican space by 
successfully wrestling it away from the control of the Jesuits and the Catholic Church. 
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This ensured that the Church, a historical enemy of French republicanism, would not be 
able to use schools as a space in which to subvert democratic society. The zealousness of 
the republican’s efforts revealed their desire to subordinate any community capable of 
posing a political or ideological threat to the new national community. Indeed, the 
physical uprooting of peasant children from the confines of their homes and towns and 
installation within these public schools both literally and figuratively cut them off from 
any connection to alternative communities; their families, churches, and towns. This 
compulsory character of public education also represented a symbolic subordination of 
alternative communities to the nation. Uniform language instruction contributed to the 
subordination of regional and religious communities to the Republic.  
Historical education also served to strengthen the bonds of national unity and 
reinforce this republican collective memory. The history of France’s glorious 
accomplishments combined with an emphasis on the obligation of military service and 
moral instruction aimed to inculcate a fierce patriotism in French students.39  These 
lessons permitted students to conceptualize themselves as members of a community 
firmly established in history and deserving of their loyalty and service. Furthermore, this 
education provided students with the knowledge and imagery necessary to imagine the 
unseen nation of which that they were a part. For example, George Bruno’s popular 
textbook, Tour de France par deux enfants, offered French students a written and visual 
representation of the nation that they were members of.40 This portrayal of the geography 
of France deliberately implied that the country enjoyed a distinct regional and cultural 
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unity under the aegis of the Republic and the nation. In this fashion, the French State used 
education in an attempt to make the Republic and the nation synonymous.  
The Third Republic’s efforts to subordinate competing visions of the past to a 
republican narrative did not enjoy total success. Nor did teachers fully possess the 
public’s trust. Angered Catholic and conservative communities resisted the Republic’s 
progressive and secular vision of the French past, even after their defeat in the Dreyfus 
Affair. In 1904, scandal broke out when history teacher Amadée Thalamas refused to 
accept a student’s essay that acknowledged the divine character of Joan of Arc. Thalamas 
denied that the student’s interpretation of the past was valid, due to the fact that he did 
not consider the Christian God or his miracles to be valid historical evidence.41 
Republican positivism and anti-clericalism likely motivated Thalamas’s refusal to accept 
the student’s essay, which made him a target for reactionary movements. Mass protests 
against Thalamas broke out in Paris, where reactionary and anti-Semitic crowds clashed 
with left-leaning counter-protests.42 Concerns over what past(s) were taught in the 
classroom were not the exclusive domain of the extreme Right. Public suspicion and 
anger at “unpatriotic” teachers resurfaced again in the interwar period. Mona Siegel noted 
that the French Left and Right as well as contemporary historians accused the Republic’s 
teachers of sapping the nation’s will to fight during World War II by teaching its youth a 
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strident pacifism.43 In short, the public classroom remained a space, republican as it may 
be, in which the national past continued and continues to be contested.  
D. The Collapse of a Republican Past?  
Certainly, one can argue the extent to which the Third Republic successfully 
supplanted other communities that fought for control over the nation. For example, 
Robert Gildea’s work, The Past in French History, extensively detailed how rival 
communities of royalists, radical right-wing politicians, socialists and Bonapartists 
continued to thrive in French society and transmit their own visions of the French past to 
the general public.44 Still, the memory of the Revolution and the Republic formed an 
imposing meta-narrative that all French citizens could recognize and with which they 
obligated to interact, if only for the purpose of refuting it. However, this republican 
memory was by no means invulnerable. In fact, republican France found itself gravely 
threatened by the catastrophic experience of World War II. The quick collapse of the 
Third Republic during the 1940 invasion shook France to its core, and many citizens 
sought out an answer as to this shocking defeat was possible.45 Public disillusionment 
paved the way for the establishment of a conservative and authoritarian government led 
by the war hero Philippe Pétain. In spite of initial optimism towards the Maréchal’s new 
regime, Vichy’s use of a repressive police force against French citizens, namely workers, 
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republican and communist agitators, and Jews; repression of the resistance; and its 
complicity with Germany’s conscription of forced labor and deportation of Jews left 
behind bitter divisions in the postwar era. Henry Rousso examined France’s agonized 
effort to confront Vichy’s shadow in the national past in his book, The Vichy Syndrome: 
History and Memory in France Since 1944,46 which claims that contemporary 
recollection of Vichy has taken on pathological characteristics. Rousso stated that initial 
Gaullist efforts to efface the divisions engendered in French society and restore the 
national community through the “resistanticialist myth,” the idea that an eternal and 
timeless France had risen to resist the German occupier, ultimately failed to knit the 
nation back together.47 Although Rousso hinted at a possible resolution to this difficult 
process of France’s coming to grips with the past, he has apparently recanted his earlier 
optimism. In a collaborative work with journalist Eric Conan entitled Vichy: An Ever-
Present Past, Rousso indicated that the public discourse on Vichy has taken a dangerous 
turn, transforming into a sensationalized narrative with little or no regard for historical 
truth or critical analysis.48  
 Decolonization also contributed to the breakdown of the republican mystique, 
especially in the case of Algeria. Algeria, unlike other colonial possessions, represented 
an administrative extension of the French metropole, and this status made the war to 
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retain the territory imperative.49 The Algerian War of Independence caused catastrophic 
damage to the Fourth Republic’s stability, eventually bringing about a military coup, the 
government’s collapse and De Gaulle’s return to power. The vicious war against FLN 
partisans and the aftermath of decolonization caused significant social division and 
psychic trauma in French society, which led the Fifth Republic to cast a veil of silence 
over the conflict.  
In the war’s aftermath, the nascent Fifth Republic took steps to prevent any 
extension of the domestic tensions caused by the Algerian. President Charles De Gaulle 
granted amnesty to the majority of those who participated in the conflict, as a “…way to 
avoid continuing conflict and division over the merits of the war…”50  This amnesty 
effectively silenced any further discussion of French tactics in the war, namely torture and 
summary execution, and allowed the new Republic to avoid lengthy and divisive legal 
confrontations with domestic agitators for the FLN and the OAS. Pieds-noirs, colonists of 
European descent, and harkis, Algerian collaborators with French forces, encountered a 
cool reception when they arrived in France. Public opinion held the pieds-noirs 
responsible for the escalation of FLN violence and the nation’s failure to retain Algeria as 
a French territory.51 The French State and general public had particularly little sympathy 
for the harkis. Tens of thousands of harkis fled the Algerian State’s murderous campaign 
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against them to France, where they were housed in refugee camps and abandoned villages 
away from the general population.52 Legal amnesty, French and pieds-noirs’ discomfort, 
and harkis’ humiliation ensured that France would remain relatively silent about the 
Algerian War for decades. 
In the past two decades, the Fifth French Republic has broken its imposed silence 
and has moved to confront the ghosts of its past. President Jacques Chirac’s 
announcement at the 1995 commemoration of the Vél d’Hiv deportation that 
responsibility rested at the foot of the French State represented an important first step in 
this effort. At the commemoration, Chirac confessed that France had irrevocably 
compromised itself in its complicity with the Nazi occupiers, saying: 
France, fatherland of the Enlightenment and the Rights of Man, land of openness 
and asylum, took part in the irreparable. Betraying her word, she delivered her 
citizens to their jailers.53  
 
This confession certainly posed significant problems for the Republic, especially in 
regard to its appeal to the citizen’s loyalty to the nation. However, Chirac quickly evoked 
the narrative begun by De Gaulle, stating that the crimes Vichy committed in France’s 
name did not represent the France that the Republic embodied. 
But there is also France, a certain idea of France, upright, generous, loyal to her  
traditions, to her spirit. This France was not at Vichy...She is present, one and  
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indivisible, in the heart of these Frenchmen, these “Righteous Among Nations…54 
 
The French state may certainly have been guilty of unspeakable crimes, but the French 
nation was not. Like De Gaulle had earlier proposed, Chirac insisted that there was an 
eternal spirit that the French nation not been betrayed during World War II. This nation, 
with Free France and righteous citizens as her disciples and De Gaulle as her prophet, had 
upheld its principles by resisting the Nazi war machine and the Final Solution. However, 
the French State had the obligation to act on its high-minded principles and demonstrate 
its sincere regret and make contrition for its previous failures. The Republic had a duty to 
be vigilant against the forces that had led the State astray and Chirac made it clear that the 
Republic would zealously fight against racism, bigotry, and anti-Semitism. 
In the matter, nothing is insignificant, nothing is banal, nothing is inseparable. 
Racist crimes, the defense of revisionism, provocations of every kind- small 
phrases, one-liners-all come from the same sources… Hiding nothing of the dark 
hours in our history is to simply defend an idea of Man, of his dignity and of his 
liberty. It is to struggle against dark forces without end.55 
 
The zealous prosecution of racism and revisionism in France represented both the proof 
of France’s fidelity to the ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité and her contrition for past 
crimes. The schizophrenia of this assertion may puzzle or, frankly, trouble the observer. 
However, these two seemingly contrary thoughts reveal France’s difficulty in maintaining 
a shared national past while acting on the moral obligation to make amends for past 
crimes. 
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France also initiated tentative efforts to break its self-imposed silence about the 
Algerian War and confront its dark role in the conflict. The Republic first recognized the 
contribution of its soldiers in the Algerian War. In 1977, the French State transported an 
unknown soldier killed in the conflict to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier located under 
the Arc de Triomphe.56 This act certainly possessed a symbolic importance, as this soldier 
had now been laid to rest in a space occupied by those who gave their lives in recognized 
conflicts. In this sense, the interment of this soldier extended the nation’s recognition and 
implicit legitimization of the conflict. Nevertheless, French ambivalence over the 
Algerian War remained, and it would not be until 1999 that the Republic acknowledged 
that this event was indeed a war. Renewed discourse over the use of torture followed this 
concession. Both William Cohen and David Prochaska have noted that former FLN 
militant and torture victim Louisette Ighilahriz’s 2000 interview in Le Monde compelled 
French generals Massu and Aussaresses to recognize the army’s use of torture in the 
Algerian War.57 France’s newfound ability to admit and discuss openly the crimes and 
traumas of the Algerian War corresponded with a growing sympathy for its victims. 
Public discourse regarding torture indicated that many possessed the opinion that the 
Republic needed to perform an act of public repentance.58  
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France’s halting efforts to recognize its involvement in the Algerian War and 
complicity with torture extended to the nation’s treatment of the harkis. As previously 
mentioned, upon their arrival in France, the harkis encountered apathy and neglect from 
the French State. Little effort to integrate them into the fabric of republican society took 
place. Unlike their pieds-noirs counterparts, the harkis had tremendous difficulty proving 
their attachment and loyalty to France. Harkis’ frustration at the inability to access the 
national community exploded in the 1970’s. Angered harkis used a variety of protest 
methods, ranging from public interviews, hunger strikes, holding public officials hostage, 
to youth rioting.59  These civil disturbances forced the Republic to reevaluate its policies 
regarding the harkis. The National Assembly passed a series of reforms, namely the 
recognition of harkis veteran rights in 1974 and the provision of financial aid in 1984, 
1987, 1994, and 1995.60 The legislators hoped that these reforms would neutralize the 
sources of harkis dissatisfaction and integrate them into the national community that had 
previously alienated them.  
The campaign to bring the harkis into the national community also relied on 
memorial initiatives. In June 1994, the National Assembly passed a law that “…extended 
her recognition towards the rapatriés, former members of assimilated auxiliary forces, 
and victims of captivity in Algeria for the sacrifices that they have made.”61 This law’s 
acknowledgment of the harkis’ hardships under the broad category of rapatriés sought to 
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include this aggrieved community within the official national past. In spite of this gesture, 
the harkis communities living in France began to demand direct acknowledgment of their 
hardships in the late 1990’s and early twenty first century. Why this renewed outbreak of 
anger despite impressive legal gains and financial compensations? The harkis had likely 
observed the French State’s public admissions of guilt and contrition in its role in the 
Holocaust and, as William Cohen suggests, “…came to expect a parallel remedy for their 
ills: a state apologia and the sanction of courts to bring to justice the authors of their 
misfortunes and to redress the historic record.”62  The harkis also demanded that their 
traumatic past be recognized by the government and that those responsible for their 
suffering be brought to justice. In 2001, a harkis advocacy group attempted to file a 
lawsuit against the Republic for crimes against humanity, due to the conditions that 
surrounded their initial abandonment by the Fifth Republic.63 Furthermore, evidence of 
alienation and hostility among the harkis’ children became more and more apparent. In 
2001, the first French-Algerian soccer game had to be cancelled due to Franco-Algerian 
youth booing the Marseillaise and throwing projectiles onto the field.64 By the early 
2000’s, the French Republic found itself confronted by a community vigorously 
demanding that its place in national history be fully recognized. 
E. Lois Mémorielles: the Rise of the Legislated Past 
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The Republic’s goal to confront past crimes and address the grievances of 
aggrieved communities informed domestic policy in France in the 1990’s and 2000’s. The 
French State turned to lois mémorielles in order to accomplish this goal. The 1991 loi 
Gayssot edited the penal code to make “those who contest [...] the existence of one or 
many crimes against humanity[...] that may have been committed by members of a 
recognized criminal organization or by a person guilty of such crimes…”65 subject to 
legal prosecution. This legislation effectively criminalized the printed or verbal denial of 
documented crimes against humanity, which included historical revisionism of the 
Holocaust. French historian Robert Faurisson, a longtime Holocaust denier, found himself 
arrested, tried, and convicted for hate speech under the statues of this law.66 Certain 
memorial laws extended beyond legal penalties and endorsed distinct interpretations of 
the national past over others. The loi Taubira acknowledged the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
as a crime against humanity on the part of the French State and required that this reality 
be recognized publicly, stating that “…school curriculum and research programs will 
accord the slave trade and slavery the place that they deserve.”67  
One would think that these laws would be welcomed. After all, these laws aimed 
to recognize past wrongs and rectify their effects in French society.  Nevertheless, certain 
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historians and intellectuals watched this legislative method of historical accounting with 
considerable reservations. They believed that this growing revision of the national past 
fundamentally weakened France's political will and moral authority. For example, Pascal 
Bruckner, in his book La Tyrannie de la penitence: Essai sur le masochisme occidental,68 
argued that the French desire for repentance represented a perverse form of masochism 
that prevented France and, in general, Europe from functioning as world leaders. 
Bruckner expressed considerable frustration with France’s seemingly new penchant for 
focusing on its past errors and crimes at the exclusion of its contribution to human 
liberty.69 Alain-Gérard Slama also expressed similar frustration with France's new 
penchant for confession and contrition. He wrote in his 2006 book Le siècle de monsieur 
Pétain: Essai sur la passion identitaire,70 that the Republic's move to make amends for its 
past may produce an inability to defend the basic tenets of republican society. Slama 
identified France’s desire for compromise with its traumatic past and avoidance of future 
conflicts as responsible for the nation’s social ills.71 The perceived proliferation of 
aggrieved communities and their growing demands for reparation originated from the 
Republic’s inability to firmly accept the national past and move beyond. 
This anxiety over the social consequences of divisive histories and memories 
spawned an intellectual opposition to this legislative movement. This opposition labeled 
                                                 
68
 Bruckner, Pascal. La Tyrannie de la Pénitence: Essai sur le masochisme occidental. (Paris: 
Grasset, 2006). 
 
69
 Bruckner, Pascal. La Tyrannie de la Pénitence: Essai sur le masochisme occidental. (Paris: 
Grasset, 2006), 45.  
 
70
 Alain-Gérard Slama. Le siècle de monsieur Pétain: Essai sur la passion identitaire. (Paris: 
Perrin, 2005). 
 
71
 Slama. Le siècle de monsieur Pétain, 13-14. 
 31 
the general movement for confronting traumatic memories of past as communitarianisme, 
which, according to Nathan Bracher’s definition, breaks France down into exclusive 
communities grounded in regional, ethnic, or religious attachments.72 The repeated act of 
contrition on the part of the French State, they stated, disillusioned the common citizen to 
the realities of the Republic and encouraged him to embrace previous identities that 
Republic had successfully kept subordinated. The result has been, according to these 
intellectuals, chaos. At the heart of their protest lay the desire to move beyond the routine 
acknowledgement of past crimes. When does a nation have the right to forget? To put 
aside its past? Jeffrey Blustein, for example, has argued that nations have the obligation 
to recognize past moral failings in its past and remember them.73 Nevertheless, this 
imperative to remember leaves little room for considerations on its impact on the present. 
Does a nation have the obligation to remember its past, particularly when it appears to 
destabilize the present? These are exactly the questions that France would confront during 
its debate over the loi du 23 février 2005. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LOI DU 23 FÉVRIER 2005 AND OPPOSITION TO LEGISLATED 
HISTORY 
The apparent right of the French State to legislate history and endorse particular 
narratives over others did not arouse widespread national dissent until the National 
Assembly passed the loi du 23 février 2005. What was it about this law that provoked 
such a ferocious denial of this type of legislation? Why did French historians and 
educators choose this moment to launch their opposition? The controversy that 
surrounded the loi du 23 février 2005 related not only to the historical narrative allegedly 
endorsed by the law. Outcry against the loi du 23 février 2005 also came from mounting 
anxieties about professional autonomy and free speech in select circles of French 
historians and educators. The National Assembly’s brazen mandate that teachers respect 
the “rôle positif” of French colonization prompted numerous scholars to protest the 
French State’s growing influence over scholarship and education. In response, historians 
organized into two advocacy groups to combat the proliferation of lois mémorielles. Both 
advocated an objective account of French history capable of accommodating multiple 
narratives. Surprisingly, this vision of a common national history shared considerable 
ground with the Republic’s. Still, the heart of the controversy dealt with the issue of what 
authority the French State possessed in the matter of writing history and, more broadly, its 
right to endorse particular interpretations of the national past over others. 
A. The  Loi du 23 février 2005: A Panacea for Harkis and Pieds-Noirs Suffering?  
 
When Minister Hamlaoui Mekachéra introduced the law to the floor of the 
National Assembly on June 11th 2004, he likely did not foresee the considerable 
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opposition that would later emerge in 2005. His presentation of the bill to the National 
Assembly looked little like the nostalgic colonialism that the law's opponents later 
accused it of being. Rather, Mekachéra portrayed the bill as the capstone to the previously 
mentioned series of laws designed to indemnify the rapatriés, the broad category of 
French citizens and colonial subjects who had fled to France in the wake of the breakup 
of the Empire, and facilitate their integration into French society.74 However, Mekachéra 
did not stop at financial and social compensation for this aggrieved community. The effort 
to fully integrate the rapatriés into the fabric of the French nation would be accomplished 
through both financial reparation and inclusion within the national historical narrative. To 
Mekachéra, the rapatriés had proven their loyalty to France through suffering and 
sacrifice and had thus secured their right to inclusion within the Republic’s history. The 
Minister conveyed his point at the rostrum by highlighting the stark contrast between the 
social marginalization that the rapatrié community had suffered and the merited 
recognition for their passionate contribution to the patrie.   
The government proposes today to render justice to the beauty and grandeur of 
our compatriots who have fought outside of France, as well as their suffering and 
hardships, as well as their loyalty to the patrie and to the Republic [...] Often 
caricatured, sometimes slandered, the work of the French should be a source of 
pride for the Nation; that which we have built with passion and courage should be 
nevertheless recognized alongside the dramatic circumstances of the separation 
from those territories so loved and served.75  
 
The Minister defended the rapatriés and insisted that they be given the proper respect for 
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their contributions to the building of the Republic. Nevertheless, Mekachéra's statement, 
intentionally or not, did extend approval of the colonial project that these individuals had 
once participated in. The tacit connection made between the experience of decolonization 
and the recognition of the passionate devotion of the rapatriés certainly contributed to the 
fierce contestation of France’s colonial past that followed this law’s passing.  
 Monetary reparations and privileged access to social services did not necessarily 
constitute contested avenues of social integration. The French Republic has provided 
various forms of social assistance to its citizens in the past. What made this law different 
from previous acts of indemnification was the French State's willingness actively to use 
national history as a component of the rapatriés' integration into the fabric of Republican 
society.76 Mekachéra's support of the proposed law indicated his belief that only the 
national acknowledgment of the traumas experienced in the rapatriés' past could provide 
the salve to assuage their physical and emotional wounds, prove the Republic's interest in 
their community, and bridge the perceived gap between the greater national community 
and their own. The aggressive demands of the harkis for national recognition likely 
inspired this deviation. That would certainly explain Mekachéra’s presentation of the 
proposed law as a corrective measure, one that readjusted the public memory of the 
national past in ways similar to the loi Taubira. He aimed to rescue the history of the 
rapatriés from the silence that had been imposed upon it, stating that: 
This text is therefore not devoid of a historical thrust: it will be one in which the 
nation proclaims the efforts that she owes to give in favor of the rapatriés, victims  
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of the inexorable march of history which, too often, writes itself with the blood 
and the tears of those it forgets.77 
 
Recovery from the traumas of decolonization could be possible only by rescuing and 
restoring the “forgotten” history of the rapatriés. Only once France recognized the 
physical and mental anguish of that community could it truly move on. 
 The desire of the Minister and those Assemblymen partial to the law did not 
reflect a purely humanitarian gesture. They also articulated a distinct concern that the 
rapatriés needed to be quickly integrated into the framework of French society before the 
opportunity had passed. This fear reflected the historical republican anxieties over the 
presence of communities living outside the social confines of the Republic. If these 
communities’ existence persisted, republicans feared that they would compete for the 
loyalties of their citizens and undermine republican rule. Patrick Delnatte, an UMP 
delegate, succinctly captured this age-old fear, saying: 
They know a true identity crisis and poorly tolerate their exclusion. Often 
assimilated into the immigrant population, they are victims themselves of 
unacceptable behavior that becomes tied to their names, appearance, or 
neighborhood.78   
 
What truly frightened Delnatte and, by extension, his fellow members of the UMP was 
the possibility that the rapatriés, in spite of their proofs of loyalty to the Republic, would 
ultimately dissolve that bond and embrace in its place an affiliation to what was perceived 
as a defiantly unassimilated and hostile community of immigrants. This fear of the 
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growing immigrant community within France later bubbled over in the tumultuous 
experience of the 2005 riots in the Parisian banlieues. This is not to suggest that the 
French assemblymen considered the rapatrié community to be an immediate threat. In 
fact, Delnatte considered the rapatriés as victims, whose initial social exclusion at their 
arrival to the metropole had been further exacerbated by their poor choice of friends. 
Therefore, in order to break the rapatriés association with this alien and threatening 
community of immigrants and bring them back into the folds of the national community, 
the Assemblymen determined that both the rapatriés and the general public needed to be 
taught a history that highlighted their common bonds to the French Republic. This act of 
public recognition of the rapatriés' history aimed at fostering national reconciliation and 
neutralizing a potentially hostile community living within the Republic. 
 This desire to simultaneously to recognize the exceptional narrative of the 
rapatriés in French history and integrate those experiences into the fabric of national 
memory enjoyed considerable currency among right-wing and centrist deputies. For these 
delegates, the alleged ignorance of the general public concerning the history of the 
rapatriés represented a grievous social and moral fault. Christian Kert, UMP delegate and 
member of the Commission des affaires culturelles, observed that forgetting the 
experiences of the rapatriés represented a political failure as well as an historical one, 
declaring that “(i)n history and in politics, there are some heritages which one cannot 
renounce.” 79 How did the legislators hope to stem the tides of public forgetfulness? They 
intended to transmit the history of the rapatriés through historical instruction in schools. 
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French youth would be the bearers of this new memory, which would then germinate in 
their hearts and minds and be passed down to their offspring. Of course, this effort 
entailed a significant revision of France’s colonial past. Lionnel Luca, a UMP delegate, 
insisted that French schools need to teach that “…that France had not been colonialist, 
but rather a colonizer, and that she had transmitted republican values to the elites that  
today now lead those people.80 Luca’s vision of the French past demanded a complete 
revision of the colonial adventure. In order for the rapatriés, a product of France's 
colonial past, to be considered worthy of membership in the Republic, the French State 
had to encourage a selective forgetting of the colonial past. This reimagination cast the 
colonial adventure as a humanitarian effort that effectively transmitted republicanism to 
the political elite of colonized territories. This embrace of the mission civilisatrice may 
appear to be nostalgia for the days of empire. Nonetheless, Luca's espousal of the mission 
civilisatrice and the benevolent character of French colonization offered a means to erase 
the historical stigma attached to the rapatriés and the circumstances of their return to 
France. The return of the rapatriés to France no longer represented the shameful failure of 
empire and complicity with a violent and oppressive regime. Instead, the rapatriés 
became emissaries of the lumières of French civilization, republican pilgrims returning 
home from their travels. In order to achieve this, UMP delegates hinted at a direct 
intervention in the classroom. UMP delegate Cecile Gallez voiced this possibility, stating, 
“(i)t is also necessary that textbooks rightfully accord the history of France and its  
 
                                                 
 
80
 Compte Rendu Analytique Officiel: Session ordinaire de 2003-2004 - 103ème jour de séance, 
253ème séance, 1ère Séance du Vendredi 11Juin 2004. 
 38 
overseas territories a complete and impartial history.”81 Thus, the introduction of the 
benevolent effects of French colonialism represented a corrective measure designed to 
restore an objective account of history. In this light, the loi du 23 février 2005 had much 
in common with the loi Taubira's declaration in that they both aimed to restore lost 
narratives to national consciousness.  
 The French Left did little to counter this particular piece of legislation. Indeed, the 
delegates of the Parti Socialiste and the Parti Communiste expressed few reservations in 
regards to the language that framed the Right's arguments for the restoration of the 
benevolent narrative of the colonial adventure. Certainly, the sparse number of left-wing 
delegates may explain the absence of a contentious rebuttal to the UMP delegates.82 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the delegates of the PS and the PCF all expressed their 
deep respect for the suffering that the rapatriés had undergone in the name of their loyalty 
to France. At the crux of the matter, the Right and the Left's understanding of the loi du 
23 février 2005 possessed few divergences. What truly distinguished the Left's 
contribution to the law was the issue of historical responsibility and blame. Like the 
Right, the Left identified the rapatriés as victims. François Liberti, a Communist 
delegate, referred to the rapatriés as “…victims for forty-two years of a true denial of  
 
                                                 
81
 Compte Rendu Analytique Officiel: Session ordinaire de 2003-2004 - 103ème jour de séance, 
253ème séance, 1ère Séance du Vendredi 11Juin 2004. 
 
82
 Assemblymen Gérard Bapt alludes to this, although makes no reference to the number present. 
Compte Rendu Analytique Officiel: Session ordinaire de 2003-2004 - 103ème jour de séance, 253ème 
séance, 1ère Séance du Vendredi 11Juin 2004. 
 39 
justice.” 83 However, this perceived victimization compelled the left-wing delegates to 
demand that the law deliver justice through a full accounting of the historical 
circumstances that had brought the rapatriés to France's shores in the first place. They 
demanded that the previously mentioned institute charged with the study and 
commemoration of French activities overseas also investigate the conditions responsible 
for the rapatriés' migration and subsequent suffering. Jacques Bascou, a radical socialist, 
requested that the proposed law establish an inquiry commission to determine the 
responsible parties for “…the events that followed the cease-fire, the abandonment of 
petitioners and harkis, the massacres and deportations, the shootings of March 26th, 1962 
and the following massacre of July 5th.” 84 The French Left was not satisfied that the law 
indemnify the rapatriés with material compensation and historical validation. The left-
wing delegates also desired a complete moral accounting of the past. To the left-wing 
delegates of the National Assembly, the determination of guilt made the possibility of 
national atonement attainable. Only once the Republic admitted its complicity in this 
situation could true justice be obtained for the rapatriés and their integration into French 
society made possible. Jacques Bascou, a socialist deputy, spoke passionately in favor of 
such an action, shrewdly comparing the need to identify guilty parties to that in past 
investigations of the Vichy State. 
Everyone recognizes the work of the French overseas. But this recognition must 
also entail responsibility, who has the right to reparations, as we had done for  
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Vichy. That is why we have asked for an investigation to establish the responsible 
parties and accept our history.85   
 
In spite of their insistence, the Left found their demands rebuffed by the Right. This 
rebuff did not represent any form of “tit-for-tat” politicking. Rather, the Right's refusal to 
comply with the demand for an inquisitive commission revealed the delicate balance of 
remembrance and forgetting that they hoped to establish in their revised historical 
narrative of French colonialism. In order for the rapatriés to be integrated into the 
Republic, they needed to be reconceptualized as participants in the Republic's historical 
mission of spreading political and cultural enlightenment. Their suffering would be 
explained through the framework of an undying devotion to that historical mission 
synonymous with the modern French state. The discussion of responsibility for past 
sufferings, particularly in regard to France's response to the immediate violence that took 
place in Algeria after the signing of the Evian Accords, would only complicate this 
narrative. Ironically, the rapatriés could become fully integrated into the French nation 
only through the deliberate remembrance of their suffering and the intentional forgetting 
of the circumstances that caused that suffering.  
 These disagreements continued as the National Assembly extended its debate into 
early February 2005. The French Left still pushed vigorously for an acknowledgment of 
France's historical responsibility in regards to the creation of the rapatrié community. 
François Liberti insisted on this point and he was not afraid to raise the shadows of their 
colonial past to make his point. For Liberti, this public acknowledgment of responsibility 
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did not mean that France officially repent for its past. Rather, this act would serve as a 
strong refutation of the colonial policies that produced the rapatrié community and, 
therefore, forge an unbreakable bond between it and the Republic. Liberti framed this 
argument as a historical and moral imperative for the nation, stating: 
Esteemed Minister, there are meetings with history that one must not miss. The 
French State has a responsibility in regards to these people and their descendants. 
These Frenchmen born in Algeria, their children, the war orphans, and the war 
widows living in France do not demand charity, even less our repentance, but  
condemnation of the politics that plunged an entire people into misfortune and a 
respect for their rights as citizens. 86 
 
France did not need to apologize but instead should renounce its past in order to mend its 
wounds. The desired integration of the rapatriés would not be achieved until France 
rejected the undesirable elements of her past that had caused this problem in the first 
place.  
 Ultimately, centrist and conservative assemblymen blocked any effort to discuss 
responsibility on the grounds that there was simply not enough historical evidence to pass 
judgment over the guilty parties. Assemblyman Christian Kert completely rejected any 
pretensions to historical authority that the National Assembly might claim, stating that 
historians had not yet uncovered all the facts necessary for talk of responsibility.87 In 
short, the conservatives declared that the delegates of the National Assembly could 
recognize the fact that something had happened but could go no farther. Any historical or 
moral judgment fell to the historian, who was properly trained to determine these facts 
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through careful inquiry and examination. Clearly, this position had a practical advantage. 
The formal acknowledgment of an irrefutable historical fact imposed very little political 
or social obligation to reflect on the national past. Any legislation of historical 
responsibility would have required assigning blame to specific parties, which would 
likely be followed by lengthy demands for public apology. Neither the Center nor the  
Right desired a protracted and complicated discussion of the national past, and that is why 
they laid the responsibility to investigate the details of the French past on historians.  
 Why this abrupt deference to the historian? These assemblymen likely thought 
that, by banishing traumatic and controversial memories out of the public sphere and into 
the academic realm of the historian, they could neutralize these troublesome issues from 
surfacing in public discourse. The historian relieved these politicians from having to 
confront and negotiate with the difficult aspects of their past. Any potentially divisive 
memory would be the historian’s responsibility. With that, the loi du 23 février 2005 was 
passed. 
B. Historians and Educators React Against Legislated History 
 The initial months following the law’s ratification saw the first stirrings of 
opposition. Those who did come forward first against the law typically did not express 
any particular onus against the historical narrative that it sought to establish. Instead, 
these individuals usually belonged to the professional class of historians, researchers, and 
educators who felt threatened by the law's potential consequences for the integrity of their 
profession. Even before the passage of the loi du 23 février 2005, certain scholars 
expressed their concerns. Benoît Falaize and Françoise Lantheaume, researchers at the 
Institut national de recherche pédagogique, published an article in Liberation that 
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outlined the standard argument against the law. According to the article, the loi du 23 
février 2005 made two mistaken assumptions that needed to be corrected. First, the 
authors criticized the National Assembly's perceived interference in the design and 
implementation of national curriculum. They took particular issue with the legislators’ 
apparent “...understanding of the act of teaching as a simple and mechanical application  
of curriculum.”88 The implicit statement made here was that the teaching of history 
comprised more than the memorization and recitation of historical “facts.” Rather, both 
authors presented historical education as a complex activity dependent on the 
unencumbered translation of recent developments in historical research into the 
classroom.89 According to Falaize and Lantheaume, this vital exchange between 
historians and educators provided educators an approach to history capable of 
overcoming any racial, ethnic, or familial biases that the student possessed and conveying 
an objective narrative that acknowledged the complexities and contradictions of the 
French national past.90 Like their legislators, French scholars desired a complex and 
nuanced historical narrative in French schools that could neutralize contentious and 
divergent memories and incorporate all citizens into the historic national community. This 
common desire, as strange as it may seem to the American reader, likely derived from the 
politicians’ and scholars’ common education at the elite schools of France. Furthermore, 
the historians and educators’ reliance on the Republic for certification and financial 
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support may also have influenced how they framed their arguments. Regardless of their 
commonalties, scholars passionately disagreed with the Right's vision of the national past 
and argued that social unity could be achieved only through a history that openly 
acknowledged all of France’s historical complexities and contradictions. 
 The second mistake allegedly made by the National Assembly dealt squarely with 
the legislators' accusation that the history of French colonialism taught in schools focused 
disproportionately on its negative aspects. According to Falaize and Lantheaume, the idea 
that French schools taught only the negative consequences of colonialism represented a 
misportrayal of current curriculum.91 Although they did not cite any particular evidence to 
back up that claim, the authors quickly voiced their fears of the impact the perceived 
nostalgia for the mission civilisatrice might have on French society. Politicians, editors, 
and teachers, they wrote, might now consider downplaying or ignoring the racist and 
exploitative character of France’s presence overseas.92 Like the French Left, these authors 
refused to accept a national past that glossed over the causes of various sufferings 
endured in French history. They too suggested that a full accounting of the past could 
furnish the Republic with a common history: 
To say this history in class, in all its complexity, far from any moral judgment, 
founded on the latest scientific methods, analyzes the colonial encounter and its 
effects on past and contemporary French society, here and overseas, is to 
contribute to the fabrication of a common history and a sentiment of sharing, 
which is also one of the missions of historical education.93  
 
This outlined method of historical teaching too, the authors claimed, could provide a 
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common history for the French Republic through a complete and unbiased recitation of 
the national past. Nevertheless, this particular expression of historical pedagogy relied 
heavily on claims of scientific neutrality and objectivity. Therefore, in order to fulfill their 
intended duties, French historians and educators needed to be free of any type of 
government intrusion that might compromise their complex and objective narrative to the 
general public.   
 French scholars’ desire to preserve professional autonomy and objectivity 
compelled them to organize. At first, the effort against the law lacked direction. On April 
14th, 2005, French historians gave a press conference outside the Ligue des droits de 
l'homme in protest to the loi du 23 février 2005’s enforcement of an “official” history of 
French colonialism.94 As the months passed by, the tenor of the historian's criticisms 
became more and more strident and energetic. What had raised the stakes? The likely 
cause for the historians' escalated involvement in this public criticism of the loi du 23 
février 2005 can be found in a related controversy concerning French history.95 By the 
summer of 2005, French historians got a glimpse of the potential future of France if this 
genre of memorial legislation continued. On June 12th, the Antillean-Guyanian-
Reunionian Collective filed a lawsuit against historian Olivier Petre-Grenouilleau for his 
rejection of the trans-Atlantic slave trade as a crime against humanity, an illegal denial of 
a recognized crime against humanity under the loi Taubira and the loi Gayssot.96 The 
                                                 
94
 Arnaud Didier. “Des historiens en guerre contre la colonisation «positive»,” Libération. April 14 
2005, http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101525763-des-historiens-en-guerre-contre-la-colonisation-positive 
(Accessed April 29, 2010). 
 
95
 Pierre Nora makes this point clear in his testimony given in the Accoyer Report. 
  
 
96
 Eric Conan. “Encore aujourd'hui; Esclavage,” L'Express,N 861, pg. 22, May 4, 2006. 
 46 
application of these two laws likely instilled a distinct feeling of vulnerability because 
French historians published a national petition that firmly rejected the memory wars 
raging in the country and any equivalency between history and memory on December 12, 
2005. The signatories of this petition, including Pierre Nora, Mona Ozouf, Jean-Pierre 
Azéma, Réné Rémond, and Marc Ferro, deliberately subordinated memory to the virtues 
of historical research, bluntly writing:  
History is not memory. The historian, in a scientific procedure, collects the 
memories of individuals, compares them with each other, examines them next to 
documents, objects, traces, and establishes the facts. History takes memory into 
account; it is not memory.97 
 
Like the authors of the early Liberation article, the drafters of December 12 Petition 
viewed the loi du 23 février 2005 as a serious threat to the scientific methodology that 
preserved historical objectivity. For these historians, memory did possess a role in the 
study of history but only insofar as potential evidence equivalent to other artifacts from 
the past. Many of these signatories would later become members of Liberté pour 
l'histoire, an advocacy group that demanded complete intellectual freedom for the 
historian. In order to secure that freedom, the petition demanded the complete abrogation 
of the loi Gayssot, the loi Taubira, the Loi du 29 janvier 2001 relative à la 
reconnaissance du génocide arménien de 1915, and the loi du 23 février 2005.98 The 
elimination of the threat against historians and their research required that they not be 
subject to laws that could potentially censor their publications. This position drew the 
implicit conclusion that the memory wars in France would be resolved by the Republic’s 
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abandonment of all legislative efforts to dictate the content and character of the national 
past.  
 Not all historians shared this uncompromising position of the Liberté pour 
l'histoire movement. The Comité du Vigilance face aux usages publics de l'histoire 
(CVUH) also formed to confront the perceived threat of the lois mémorielles to the 
integrity of historical research in June 2005. Nevertheless, unlike their peers in Liberté 
pour l'histoire, the adherents of the CVUH focused more on the social consequences of 
the lois mémorielles. The CVUH’s manifest attributed to the lois mémorielles a 
destabilizing influence in French society. According to the manifest, these laws 
encouraged an unhealthy competition between aggrieved communities for national 
recognition, which grossly distorted the general public’s understanding of the national 
past.99 The CVUH framed the growing obsession with the crimes of the past in medical 
terms, pointing out that national discourse on memory had become “…more and more 
unhealthy.”100 The prescription for alleviating this frenzy of remembrance was not a dose 
of forgetfulness. Unlike the French State, the CVUH did not believe that the restoration of 
social unity could be accomplished through the careful combination of official 
recognition and forgetfulness. Instead, the CVUH proposed that social cohesiveness could 
be restored through the full and accurate recitation of the national past. This all-
encompassing historical narrative would prevent future memorial conflicts by presenting  
all the complexities and contradictions of the French past to the citizen.101  
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 Furthermore, the CVUH envisioned a much broader social role for the historian. 
According to this organization, the historian would become the agent responsible for the 
transmission of this complex and methodologically sound vision of the national past to 
the general public.102 The CVUH did not echo Liberté pour l'histoire's demands for 
scholarly detachment from society and insisted that the historian must occupy a central 
position in any public discourse devoted to the subject of the past in order to facilitate a 
better understanding of history to all French citizens. Historians, the CVUH claimed, 
“…must try hard to put at disposal all the knowledge and touchy questions to encourage a 
better comprehension of history, in a manner to nourish the critical faculties of 
citizens.”103 Only the historian could provide the citizenry with the proper information to 
fully appreciate the complexity of the national past and overcome their communal biases. 
This component of public mentoring stood in direct opposition to Liberté pour l'histoire's 
belief in the historian’s strict isolation from society. This social activism expressed by the 
CVUH likely explained their refusal to call into question the existence of the loi 
Gayssot.104 The loi Gayssot’s guarantee against historical revisionism and racist verbal or 
physical attacks served a vital social function, one that some historians were not willing 
to challenge. 
 French educators too expressed hostility towards the loi du 23 février 2005, 
especially for its fourth article which required that educators respect the “rôle positif” of 
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colonization in French history. Teachers deeply resented the National Assembly’s 
perceived intrusion into the realm of pedagogy, and their advocacy groups moved to 
articulate that anger. Like French historians, educators expressed an acute anxiety that the 
law ignored contemporary historical research and scholarly consensus and imposed an 
absolute interpretation of the past with no room for dissent. An article published by the 
SNES, the syndicat national de l'enseignement du seconde dégré, went further than many 
opposing historians and accused that “…the official ‘truth’ declared here- ‘the positive 
role of French presence overseas’- is a partisan truth, clearly linked to the ideology of the 
partisans of colonization who try today to take their revenge on history.”105 The French 
educators' resistance to the law derived not only from their desire for professional 
autonomy. Accusations of prejudice and calls for objectivity framed the outlined the 
criticism of the law. Unlike most opposing historians, French educators did not hesitate to 
accuse their legislators of being colonial partisans eager to remake history in their own 
image. For educators, this alleged bias invalidated these legislators’ claims to authority in 
historical matters. They believed that this rehabilitation of the colonial past had dire 
consequences for the republican values that schools were meant to instill in their students. 
Legislated history came at the cost of “…the liberty of thought, inadmissible in a 
democracy and in a bastion of laïcité and grave at a moment where certain individuals are 
not afraid to racialize social tensions and inequalities.”106 French educators considered 
any endorsed history contrary to laïcité, the republican policy that prevents the display or 
transmission of sectarian symbols or discourse in public spaces. The violation of free 
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thought in French schools likely resonated strongly at this moment for numerous reasons. 
First of all, 2005 saw the centennial anniversary of the 1905 law, which firmly implanted 
the policy of laïcité into republican society and established its secular character. 
Furthermore, the loi du 15 mars 2004 firmly established the school as a neutral space, 
free of any sign of religious affiliation.107 By portraying themselves as the defenders of 
laïcité and republican egalitarianism, French educators framed their devotion to scientific 
historical inquiry with republican civic-mindedness.  
 Public intellectuals took this particular idea expressed by the SNES and 
expounded upon it at length in their writings. In an article in Le Figaro, Alain-Gérard 
Slama stated that the National Assembly had “...no qualifications to indicate the 
ideological orientation of that curriculum.”108 Slama's major criticism of the government's 
legislation had to do with its apparent lack of neutrality. The Republic’s neutrality in 
public affairs needed to be preserved in order to maintain social equality, and the National 
Assembly had clearly failed in that duty by their endorsement of a particular historical 
narrative. Slama's indictment of right-wing and centrist legislators who ratified the law 
also extended to their left-wing opponents. He accused the Left of attempting to counter 
the Right's official history with its own, especially in the matter of slavery.109 Slama most 
opposed the absolute historical narratives offered by the Right and Left's respective 
                                                 
107
 French National Assembly. LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du 
principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, 
collèges et lycées publics. JORF n°65, Legifrance. March 15, 2004. http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr 
/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=66D8E5B1FD45CBFFA8D250324FC0C07A.tpdjo06v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEX
T000000417977&categorieLien=id (Accessed May 9, 2010). 
   
108
 Alain-Gérard Slama. “L'histoire en otage: La Chronique d'Alain-Gérard Slama,” Le Figaro, 
April 18, 2005, N˚ 18880, Débats et Opinions, pg. 13. 
 
109
 Slama. “L'histoire en otage: La Chronique d'Alain-Gérard Slama”. 
 51 
partisans that sought to elevate one particular community's memory over another. To him, 
the Right's embrace of former colonial collaborators and the Left's stolid defense of the 
colonized represented dangerously divisive accounts the national past. Above all, Slama 
abhorred the communitarian impulse behind the loi du 23 février 2005, stating:  
Since the Republic has given way to the pressure of ethnic and religious 
communities to recognize particular rights and material concessions, we have thus 
seen the decline of the demand to forget and the rules of proscription that Renan 
judged necessary to the maintenance of civil peace and national solidarity.110  
 
This frenzied accounting of the national past provoked by the demands of certain 
communities within the Republic had brought traumatic memories of the past back to the 
surface of national consciousness. Instead of putting aside and forgetting these memories 
in the goal of forging a common nation, French citizens supposedly now relived ancient 
feuds and conflicts in an effort to attain formal recognition of their contribution or 
sufferings.  
 This mistrust of any type of competing memorial narratives found another voice in 
the historian Max Gallo. Gallo expressed similar concerns in Le Figaro, writing that 
“(t)he controversy over colonization is nothing more than a lever to discriminate by 
ethnic origins and construct communities hostile to the Republic by a colonial past that 
would explain existing inequalities between French citizens.”111 For Gallo, the loi du 23 
février 2005 acted as a political and social wedge that tore asunder threads of national 
attachment and reframed national identity along ethnic lines. Worse, these newly formed 
communities were hostile to the Republic due to the fact that they portrayed 
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contemporary inequalities in French society to be the historical product of the colonial 
past.112 In this light, the French Republic transformed into an entity synonymous with 
racism and oppression, fundamentally incapable of reform. Interestingly, Gallo did not 
advise forgetfulness or silence to heal the wounds reopened by this contest between 
visions of the national past. Instead, Gallo proposed a general openness in French society 
in regard to the diversity of the national past and sternly reminded his readers that human 
suffering was not monopolized by one particular community within the Republic. He 
made this point particularly clear by noting that “(i)f colonized people retain the wound of 
the colonial period, the French living in the metropole, notably the pieds-noirs, have an 
open wound deep down also.”113 In order to reestablish a common, objective account of 
France’s past, Gallo insisted that the French public be willing to accept and honor all 
components of its history, even those that they may not share or approve.  
C. The National Assembly is Forced to Reconsider the loi du 23 février 2005 
 By December 2005, the controversy that the assemblymen had desired to avoid 
erupted. As previously discussed, public outcry focused on the fourth article of the loi du 
23 février 2005 which required that the “rôle positif” of French colonisation receive the 
appropriate attention in the French classroom and in academia. The law had also 
unleashed a storm of international protest. President of Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika  
angrily denounced the law, accusing it of historical revisionism.114 The outpouring of 
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protest compelled Parti Socialist to petition the National Assembly to consider the 
abrogation of the offending article. The French Left had incorporated much of the 
language used by historians and educators to frame their opposition to the law, 
particularly in its assertion that the Assembly had exceeded its authority. Bernard 
Derosier, left-wing delegate and spokesman for the Commission des Affaires Culturelles, 
argued that the National Assembly had circumvented the duties of the Ministry of 
Education by going outside the purview of the legislative duties and dictating what could 
and could not be taught in schools, saying:  
As legislators, our task is to create laws and not to participate in the writing of 
history because we do not have the training of the sociologist, the philosopher, or 
the historian to assume that responsibility [...] In any case, it does not belong to 
the legislator to judge colonial history but rather encourage its study and memory  
 in order that the lessons taken from it improve our present and future behavior. 115  
 
Derosier described a clear divide between the spheres of activity of the legislator and the 
historian, which was the clear result of a difference in professional training. The history 
written by legislators could not be considered valid because it ultimately lacked the 
scientific methodology and the intellectual discipline that assured the neutrality and 
objectivity of the academic's conclusions. Derosier even went so far as to assert that the 
State had no right to use history as a means to ameliorate social injustices. Regardless of 
the National Assembly's intentions, the goal to restore national unity through an official 
history had only exacerbated social cleavages.116 At the heart of this assertion laid the 
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fierce desire to preserve the laïque character of the Fifth Republic, which echoed 
statements made by the CVUH, the SNES, and Alain-Gérard Slama. For many Leftist 
delegates, the National Assembly's efforts to recognize, repent, or renounce the past, 
could only fragment society into an array of competing narratives and counter-narratives. 
 The most vocal opponents of the loi du 23 février 2005 did not couch their 
arguments in the lofty principles of government neutrality. Instead, other members of the 
French Left expressed their opposition to the law on the grounds that it ignored or effaced 
compromising behavior in French history. These delegates took particular issue with the 
positive narrative that the law imposed on the education of colonialism. Hélène Mignon, 
a Socialist delegate, unleashed a scathing condemnation of this alleged benevolent 
character of the French colonial presence, stating that:  
To colonize is to annex territories often by violence or sometimes by ruse. It is to 
impose the will of the colonizer upon all, ignoring custom, the social and 
economic environment, and the rules that govern the daily lives of the 
colonized.117  
 
This definition of colonialism and its consequences for the colonized made the 
recognition of the positive aspects of French colonial rule difficult, if not impossible. 
Certainly, this refusal by the Left to acknowledge any achievements made during colonial 
rule was informed by its ideological position as anti-colonialist. To admit the positive 
aspects of colonization would compromise one of the basic tenets of contemporary 
socialism and communism. The multiculturalism espoused by the Left had no room for 
the implicit ethnocentrism present in the Right’s positive portrayal of the French Empire. 
Victorin Lurel, the Guyanne delegate of the Socialist Party, feared that the law threatened 
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to efface difference from the national consciousness and even alluded to the disastrous 
2005 Paris riots to make his point.118 According to this logic, the multicultural reality of 
France required the abrogation of a law that, through its endorsement of the mission 
civilisatrice, revived an outdated social and cultural hierarchy. The compulsory vision of 
France’s benevolent empire would make it impossible for the nation to recognize and 
respect the importance difference in the national past and arrive at a common history for 
the present.  
 Nevertheless, this brand of somewhat tired opposition to French colonialism 
certainly did not represent the Left’s final word. Jean-Pierre Brard, an independent 
assemblyman known for his sympathy for the Parti Communiste, expressed a nuanced 
evaluation of the article and the reactions that it had provoked.  Like many critics, Brard 
chafed at the implications that an official history possessed and accused his conservative 
peers of adopting a tactic contrary to the spirit that they claimed to embody, stating: 
Any desire to write an official history is dangerous and contrary to our republican 
values. The adoption of this amendment reveals a desire to hold onto a departed 
past, to reassuring images. A very strange thing, those who preach endlessly 
openness to a globalized world would like to freeze the history of our country on 
official visions dating back to the 19th century.119  
 
Certainly, like many other leftist delegates, Brard considered any official history of France 
to represent a dangerous threat to free thought. But Brard's sensitivity made him break 
away from the anti-colonial faction of the French Left. Brard desired to maintain a 
balance where the positive and negative consequences of colonialism could coexist in the 
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national past. He expressed particular wariness that, in the rush to rectify the apparent 
ideological bias in the law, Leftist assemblymen would simply substitute an anti-colonial 
narrative for a pro-colonial one.120 He wanted to ensure that the abrogation of the article 
be done in the spirit of restoring government neutrality and the freedom of thought for 
historians and educators. 
 As to be expected, the Right fought back viciously against the effort to abrogate 
the offending article. Many conservatives were bitter towards the Socialists and 
Communists, likely because none of their arguments had been raised in the initial debates 
that preceded the law's passage. In response to the anti-colonial narrative espoused by 
those like Hélène Mignon, the Right attempted to defend their position by casting the Left 
as the biased party. Several of the UMP delegates expressed their profound belief that 
French colonization had indeed brought distinct benefits to the peoples whom they had 
colonized. Michel Diefenbacher stated that the Empire “…knew shadows and light. The 
shadows existed, let's not forget that, but the light existed as well and our children should 
know that.”121 Diefenbacher conceded that the experience of the Empire consisted of 
considerable violence but insisted that the recognition of the crimes of colonization be 
balanced by the material benefits that the mission civilisatrice brought to the colonized. If 
the national past needed to be objective, then school curricula could not focus on the 
crimes of colonialism alone. The restoration of this “lost” narrative to the national past 
justified the law's intrusion into the classroom.  
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 Other conservative delegates angrily lashed out at the French Left and sought to 
present them as an insidious relic of a bygone era. They accused the Left of deliberately 
undermining the objective recitation of the national past in a self-destructive effort to 
embrace diversity and appease any aggrieved party that took issue with the Republic. 
Jean-Claude Guibal derided the Left for their opportunistic opposition, claiming that 
“(t)he nostaglics of Third-Worldism are always at work and act as if they are not 
responsible for French misfortune.”122 Guibal condemned the Left for defacing France's 
past and undermining any effort to feel pride or attachment to the Republic. His tirade 
revealed that, for certain conservatives, the threat confronting the nation was much more 
than an unassimilated community of immigrants; self-hating Frenchmen also contributed 
to the fragmentation of the Republic by criminalizing its past. Michèle Tabarot elaborated 
on the presence of this fifth column in French society, claiming that many of these 
unpatriotic Frenchmen had infiltrated the nation’s schools. Tabarot explicitly linked the 
educators’ opposition to the law to their political sympathies, claiming that she had 
not forgotten that the teachers who today demand the abrogation of this article 
under the pretext of objectivity and neutrality are the same ones who came with 
roses in their hands into our classrooms, May 11th, 1981. (Exclamation from the 
Socialist benches)123  
 
To Tabarot, historians and educators who bemoaned the Assembly’s lack of objectivity 
were being disingenuous due to the fact that they themselves were acting on their political 
beliefs. She accused the Left of being hypocritical, proclaiming that those teachers who 
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demanded the teaching of France's racist and colonial past had been those who had lauded 
the virtues of Communism in the 1960’s.124 A complicated body of long-standing 
grievances and past insults simmered and bubbled over into the National Assembly’s 
deliberations on the controversial law.  
D. Imposing Silence: Resorting to Constitutional Annulment 
 The conservative majority of the National Assembly ultimately denied the petition 
to abrogate the fourth article of the loi du 23 février 2005, which only sparked further 
controversy. Anger in the Antilles compelled renowned poet Aimé Cesaire to cancel his 
meeting with Minister of the Interior Nicholas Sarkozy.125 The animosity unleashed by 
the law forced President Jacques Chirac to demand the offending amendment’s 
abrogation on December 9thth, appointing Jean-Louis Debré, President of the National 
Assembly, to organize a parliamentary effort to fulfill that wish.126 Chirac used words of 
reconciliation, likely in effort to calm all parties. Like his conservative compatriots in the 
UMP, Chirac refused to speak in terms of repentance or responsibility. He waxed proudly 
on the character of the French nation in terms that both the Right and the Left could agree 
upon, saying: 
France is a great nation. Her past is glorious. She possesses universal values that 
cast its light on the entire world, values of liberty, justice, rights. She is marked by  
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the diversity of men and lands that represent her strength and also her richness. 
This history is our country, our identity, our future and we should be proud of it.127 
 
Chirac maintained the historical narrative desired by his fellow conservatives by 
emphasizing the proud and glorious character of the French past. Nevertheless, this 
narrative presented by the French president possessed sufficient room to incorporate 
ethnic and geographic diversity into this universal and eternal France.  
 This inclusive narrative proposed by Chirac also possessed enough memorial 
flexibility to include the darker elements of the national past. He admitted that the 
memories of the national past featured many traumas inflicted on family, friends, and 
communities that today constituted a major component of contemporary identity. 128 Still, 
the President’s words revealed the integral tension existing within the Republic’s desire to 
remember its past. Like many others, Chirac acknowledged that the national past played a 
significant role in the construction of national identity. Nevertheless, he recognized that 
history could also be a disordering agent in civil society, observing that “(h)istory is the 
key to national cohesion. But it accomplishes little for history to become an object of 
division, that the passions ignite and the wounds of the past reopen.129 History was a 
construct of opposing forces, working to both bind and divide the nation. Neither 
remembrance nor amnesia could work to arrest this controversy. Therefore, the French 
State turned to silence.   
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 In the end, the entire affair ended somewhat anti-climatically. There was no grand 
stand-off in the chambers of the National Assembly, no great confrontation in which all 
partisans would meet in a final battle. Instead, President Chirac and Jean-Louis Debré 
decided to remove the offending article from the law by a decree issued by the 
Constitutional Council under Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the Fifth Republic's constitution 
on the grounds that it did not have any bearing on the proper regulation of civil functions 
in French society.130 This effectively eliminated any need for the National Assembly to 
deliberate further on the matter. This seemed to be the point of this political manuever. 
Heated discussion within and without the Assembly could now end, avoiding any public 
loss of face or long-term ill feelings or resentments.131 This imposed silence sought to put 
the contentious issue to rest. Debré expressed a great desire that this decision would 
ultimately assure all parties of the legitimacy of their positions. He framed the act as an 
attempt at national reconciliation, stating that “…my wish is that there may be no 
humiliation, no renouncement, no rejection, nor repentance. Each person has his truth.”132 
This statement expressed a keen desire to avoid any further discussion of the matter at 
hand by essentially agreeing to disagree. Each party retained the right to its particular 
memory of the colonial experience and no judgment would be past on anyone. The 
tortured discourse over the character of France's colonial adventure overseas would have 
to be delayed indefinitely, effectively silenced. Ironically, this abrupt termination of 
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discourse was the only way the French government could find to prevent further 
disruption in the Republic. An imposed silence was the only way to banish these troubling 
memories. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE GUY MÔQUET COMMEMORATION 
The annulment of the inflammatory fourth article of the loi du 23 février 2005 
may have put to rest the immediate controversy, but it did little to nothing to resolve the 
key issue of the French government’s place in constructing and promoting historical 
narratives. Chirac’s preemptive excision of the offending clause through constitutional 
redress prevented any further discussion, which ensured that the issue would resurface at 
a latter time. Concerns over the politicization of the national past resurfaced in the initial 
months of the 2007 presidential election and culminated in newly elected President 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s controversial commemoration of Guy Môquet. Why did the newly 
elected president choose to make French history an integral component of his rhetoric 
during the presidential campaign? Why did he later make the commemoration of a young 
communist the first official act of his presidency? Sarkozy’s fascination with France’s 
past reflected his desire to construct a national history capable of accommodating all 
communities living within the Republic without dwelling on traumatic or divisive 
moments. The newly inaugurated president sought to use Guy Môquet as an example of 
youthful patriotism and self-sacrifice worthy of emulation for French youth. However, 
instead of reviving national attachment among French youth, Sarkozy’s fait du prince 
(presidential fiat) reopened the heated debate over the Republic’s right to define and 
endorse certain historical narratives over others. Angry Leftist politicians, historians, and 
educators cried foul over the proposed commemoration and once again rose up to stand 
against the alleged instrumentalization of the national past.  
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A. Politics, Hysteria, and Nicolas Sarkozy’s histoire bling-bling 
Unlike the discourse that surrounded the loi du 23 février 2005, a peculiar 
atmosphere of hysteria and circus permeated the opposition’s argument. One may be 
reminded of Marx’s observation that history occurs first as a tragedy and then repeats 
itself as a farce.133 Although it may be tempting to dismiss the sometimes hysterical tone 
of the opposition as irrational and unfounded, I believe that one needs to understand the 
power of Nicolas Sarkozy as a political symbol. Sarkozy, the President of the UMP and 
Minister of the Interior, had remained relatively quiet during the tumultuous debates over 
the loi du 23 février 2005. His silence, however, did not protect him from being dragged 
into the controversy. As previously mentioned, popular protests and Aimé Césaire’s 
refusal to meet with him forced Sarkozy to cancel his scheduled trip to the Antilles. The 
Antilles’ vehement protest over Sarkozy’s visit appeared to be linked to his tacit 
involvement in the Parisian suburb riots that had taken place only a month before.134 
Sarkozy’s promise to root out racaille or “scum” from those neighborhoods and the fact 
that his party had sponsored the loi du 23 février 2005 made him the symbol of revived 
conservatism and nationalism in France. Historians, educators, and Leftist politicians 
transformed Sarkozy into the epitome of what they opposed, ready to be conjured at a 
moment’s notice to be damned, dissected, and dismissed. The fact that the Guy Môquet 
commemoration was intimately tied to the person of Nicolas Sarkozy likely contributed to 
his opposition’s intimate and hysterical tone.  
                                                 
133
 Karl Marx. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. (New York: Cosimo Inc, 2008), 1. 
 
134
 Yves Threard. “Sarkozy et l’inutile psychodrama.” 
 64 
 Although he contributed very little of substance to the debate over the loi du 23 
février 2005, Nicolas Sarkozy embraced the Republic’s endeavor to construct a common 
past during his presidential campaign. The incorporation of this rhetoric into his political 
program became more and more noticeable as his presidential ambitions became 
apparent. During the campaign, he frequently alluded to historical figures that belonged to 
the treasured canon of French history. However, Sarkozy did not refer exclusively to 
heroes of the French Right. Observers noted that he also referred to persons from the 
Left’s canon, like Jean Jaurès and Léon Blum, in an effort to portray himself as a 
reconciliatory figure devoted to public unity.135 The effort to situate himself within this 
conciliatory narrative certainly fit with Sarkozy’s broader efforts to construct a vision of 
the national past that bridged all social and economic divides in French society.  
However, Sarkozy’s new history did not aim to reconcile a defined community 
with the Republic. Instead, it targeted French youth for the purpose of bringing them back 
into the republican fold. The choice of audience can be likely attributed to the tumultuous 
riots in the banlieues in 2005 and the streets of Paris during the CPE debacle of 2006. 
The immediate threat to the Republic’s integrity now appeared to be a dissatisfied French 
youth, especially those related to the rapatrié and immigrant communities. At the 2006 
Université d’été des Jeunes Populaires, an annual party congress for young UMP 
militants, Sarkozy first articulated this vision of the past to the nation’s youth, indicating 
his desire to return to a more inclusive history to those present. In this speech, he 
bemoaned a France could no longer fire the ambitions of its youth and blamed that failure 
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on a fatalism that pervaded French society, warning that this “…fascination for fatalism 
clips youth’s wings.”136 Sarkozy asserted that France owed a great debt to the boundless 
energies of youth and requested that those present come to the Republic’s aid once again. 
To make this point clear, he linked the marvels and triumphs of French history, the 
French Revolution, World War I, the Resistance, and the tumultuous upheavals of 1968, 
to the vitality of the nation’s youth.137 In short, France’s preservation and 
accomplishments transformed into the fruit of its youth’s labor. Future empowerment of 
the Republic required the empowerment of all its youth, even those previously alienated 
by the national community. 
Sarkozy did, however, insist that the national community represented an 
obligation rather than one option out of many communities to choose allegiance. He 
warned French youth that liberty was impossible outside of the Republic and expressed 
his concerns that that liberty was threatened by a social breakdown facilitated by a lack of 
loyalty to the Republic. He painted a dire portrait of a France without the Republic, 
saying: 
Don’t you mistake it, without the Republic, you will no longer have individual 
liberty, justice or democracy. You will have communitarisme, tribal law, each 
person sent back to his ethnic origins, his religion, you will have citizenship that 
changes according to circumstance, you will have more instead of less intolerance. 
The Republic is not a choice. For each of us, it must be an expectation and a 
duty.138 
 
                                                 
136
 Nicolas Sarkozy. “Université d’été des Jeunes Populaires,” Université d’été des Jeunes 
Populaires, Marseille. September 3, 2006. Transcript found at Union Pour Un Mouvement Populaire. 
http://www.u-m-p.org/site/index.php/ump/s_informer/discours/universite_d_ete_des_jeunes_populaires 
_marseille_1_2_et_3_septembre_2006  (Accessed May 5, 2009). Due to renovations by the UMP web staff, 
this article must be accessed by http://archive.org. 
 
137
 Sarkozy, “Université d’été des Jeuenes Populaires.”. 
 
138
 Sarkozy, “Université d’été des Jeuenes Populaires.”. 
 66 
In this light, the Republic was the only defense against the competing factional interests 
that Sarkozy described. Association with the Republic became an imperative to hold 
these destabilizing forces at bay. Furthermore, Sarkozy voiced considerable regret that 
French youth did not express their attachment to France more visibly and frequently. He 
pointed to the example of American youth as the proper example of those who expressed 
their loyalty faithful to their country. Interestingly, he referred to the polyglot character of 
the United States as evidence of that nation’s success in inculcating national loyalty into 
its youth, stating; 
The children of the United States, a nation of immigrants, listen to the national 
anthem and salute the star-spangled banner with their hand over their heart. Why 
should French youth not be proud of their country until the French soccer team 
scores a goal? Singing the Marseillaise is not old-fashioned. Being moved before 
the tricolor is not out of style. Loving one’s fatherland is not outdated.139 
 
Sarkozy’s adulation of U.S. patriotism may appear to be somewhat simplistic and naïve to 
the American reader. However, there should be no doubt that Sarkozy made these 
statements with sincerity. These exhortations sought to instill a stronger feeling of 
obligation and attachment to the Republic in its youth. He intimately linked the young 
audience’s identity with the national identity and made them virtually indistinguishable, 
saying: “France is your country, your nation, your fatherland, and you have no other, even 
if your parents are from elsewhere […] Not to love France when you are French is to 
renounce yourself. Love France! She deserves it.”140  
Sarkozy’s repeated requests for patriotic devotion from young citizens and 
insistence that France deserved that love reflected a significant divergence in French 
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memory politics. The Minister’s recurrent statements that France did not deserve to be 
denounced and reviled by her youth revealed the refutation of President Jacques Chirac’s 
tentative moves to officially recognize and repent for past national crimes.141 According 
to Sarkozy’s vision of the past, France had nothing to apologize for. In fact, the nation 
could not afford to discuss those divisions found in the national past without causing 
significant moral damage to its citizens. If France was to face the challenges of the 
twenty-first century, then it would need to rely on a generation of French youth who 
possessed a common and positive vision of the national past. Furthermore, the growing 
number of dissatisfied French youth made this return to a more positive vision of the 
French past essential. Only by recasting the Republic as an inclusive and empowering 
entity in history, the Right believed, could it assure the continued loyalty of its youth.   
French Historians React Against Sarkozy’s histoire bling-bling: 
Some historians watched the aspiring presidential candidate construct his history 
of France with considerable dismay and issued solemn warnings of its portents for the 
future. These historians, especially those associated with the Comité de vigilance face aux 
usages publics de l’histoire, accused Sarkozy of cheapening and trivializing the nation’s 
history. Nicholas Offenstadt would later call this new history “histoire bling-bling” or 
“flashy history,” which he identified as “…flashy, loud, not very profound.”142 Offenstadt 
asserted that Sarkozy consciously ignored the historical context of his referenced figures 
and consequently committed great harm to the public’s understanding of the past. He 
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used metaphors of cheap extravagance and unbridled consumption to frame his criticism 
of Sarkozy’s histoire bling-bling, stating that it: 
…is a large blend where everything knocks about like a night club with the neon 
lights at full blast: the great names (Jaurès or Joan of Arc), great events (the 
Crusades or the Second World War) mix together without hierarchy, context, or 
care for explanation […] L’histoire bling-bling is a history of consumers, not a 
history of citizens. L’histoire bling-bling shines but it does not enlighten.143 
 
Offenstadt mainly disapproved of Sarkozy’s haphazard methodology in the construction 
of this narrative, especially for its uncritical and decontextualized allusions to people and 
events. His references to consumerism highlighted his contempt for Sarkozy’s 
undisciplined selections, presenting Sarkozy’s history as a smorgasbord where the patron 
takes what he wishes and leaves the rest behind. Oddly, the very same historians 
schizophrenically insisted that Sarkozy’s instrumentalization of history simultaneously 
represented a shallow ploy empty of substance and evidence of his nefarious designs for 
political dominance. Sylvie Aprile claimed that Sarkozy’s routine historical references to 
French history were a cheap trick designed to blind the voter. She outlined how this 
scheme functioned and hinted at a more sinister motivation lying behind it: 
All abandoned or marginalized historical references can work, on the condition of 
appearing a little shiny enough to create a brief illusion to be sold to the voter. 
There is, however, a more profound logic to this work, in spite of its incoherent 
appearance that associates Jean Jaurès and national identity together […] (I)t 
operates to bring together the margins of the Republic in order to insert them in a 
grand construct in which Sarkozy would be the only unifying feature.144 
  
Like Offendstadt, Aprile complained how Sarkozy’s historical narrative relied on the 
visceral appeal of its content rather than a scientific and rational approach. This glitzy 
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history had only a transient existence, acting quickly to ensnare the unsuspecting and 
fading just as rapidly. Nevertheless, Aprile detected in Sarkozy’s vision of the past the 
clues to a more ominous plot. His broad narrative of French history excluded Napoleon, 
the Bonapartes, and Pétain, and, according to Aprile, the exclusion of these authoritarian 
personalities revealed Sarkozy’s aspirations to his own form of dictatorship; the 
dictatorship of the free market!145 She reinforced this claim by insisting that Sarkozy’s 
liberal agenda coexisted with an insidious conservative ideology that drew on the worst 
parts of French history, namely “…pétainist and bonapartist values: the myth of the 
savior, the strong man, the conqueror; the ideology of family, work, and fatherland.”146 
This conflation of Sarkozy’s historical narrative with his perceived social conservatism, 
merited or not, led historians and educators to launch a confused demand for the 
prevention of politicized history that drew on history to justify their position. 
B. Nicolas Sarkozy’s Election and the Origins of the Môquet Commemoration 
Nicolas Sarkozy won the presidency in a close campaign against Sègolene Royale 
in May 2007. Although he won by only a narrow margin, Sarkozy appeared to interpret 
that election as a popular mandate for his political program, which included the 
establishment of his vision of French history. At his inauguration on May 16, 2007, 
Sarkozy expressed his belief that a concerted effort needed to be made in order to secure a 
common history for the Republic’s citizens. He considered the maintenance of French 
history and identity to be one of his primary duties as president of the Republic, stating 
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that he would “…defend the independence and the identity of France.”147 Later that 
evening, Sarkozy continued this line of thought at the Bois de Boulogne, the Parisian 
forest where resistance members had been ambushed and killed by Nazis during the 
Occupation’s final days. Here, Sarkozy wedded the commemoration of these national 
martyrs with his desire to secure the loyalty of French youth. Sarkozy mused that the 
devoted attachment to a free France that he saw in these members of the French resistance 
would serve as the model for French youth. Sarkozy, as in 2006, intimately linked the 
youthful character of these resistants to the eternal glory of the Republic and of France, 
stating: 
The resistants were young. They went to die. But what they embodied was 
invincible. They said “No”, “No” to fatalism, “No” to submission, “No” to 
dishonor, “No” to what dehumanizes man, and this “No” will continue to be heard 
well after their death because this “No” is the eternal cry that human liberty offers 
to all that threaten to enslave it […] This cry I want taught in our schools to our 
children to hear and to understand.148  
 
Once again, Sarkozy emphasized the Republic’s rejection of fatalism and embrace of the 
youthful energy and self-sacrifice of its youth. These virtues, he declared, needed to be 
taught in French schools through proper historical and moral instruction. Once these 
virtues had revitalized the nation’s youth, they would reintegrate back into the fabric of 
the Republic and cease their destabilizing protests.  
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In order to accomplish that goal, Sarkozy issued his first presidential decree; the 
letter of Guy Môquet would soon be read in every classroom throughout France. Sarkozy 
likely did not select Môquet on the basis of his historical significance. Rather, the tragic 
character of Môquet’s place in the history of the Occupation served as the primary appeal 
to the new President’s sensibilities. Guy Môquet, a seventeen year old communist 
arrested for distributing anti-German propaganda and executed in retaliation for the 
assassination of a German officer, provided that youthful face of patriotism and sacrifice 
that Sarkozy desired, saying that:  
(I)f I wanted the letter that Guy Môquet had been so movingly written to his 
parents on the eve of being shot, it is because I believe that it is essential to 
explain to our children that he was nothing but a young Frenchman, and to show 
them through the sacrifice of certain anonymous heroes that the history books do 
not speak of that it was the grandeur of a man who gave himself for a cause 
greater than himself.149 
 
Môquet’s letter would serve as the vehicle through which French youth could identify and 
examine youthful expressions of patriotism and, with hope, learn by example. The choice 
of the classroom represented the most sensible choice for this patriotic commemoration. 
Public schools historically had been involved in, if not associated with, the inculcation of 
acceptable republican values. In this sense, Sarkozy wished to remake the Republic’s 
schools into those of the Third Republic: sites of patriotic and nationalist indoctrination. 
Only knowledge of their national past and heritage could provide the nation’s youth with 
a defined structure of compulsory and shared beliefs, in short, a national identity. 
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C. Grudging Acceptance and Scholarly Ire: Initial Reactions to the Commemoration 
Much like the debate on the loi du 23 février 2005, opposition to the Môquet 
commemoration evolved slowly. As before, the French Left initially gave a divided 
response to the President’s efforts to provide French youth a common history grounded in 
patriotism and sacrifice. The Socialist Party, for the most part, seemed too preoccupied 
with recouping their losses for the upcoming regional elections.150 Hollande and Party 
leaders seemed to prefer rhetoric on the French economy to opposing the new president’s 
commemoration. Others on the Left who gave the commemoration more than a passing 
glance seemed somewhat open. Laurent Joffrin, Libération’s editorial staff director, 
offered sympathetic support for the President’s decree, signaling the opposition to put 
aside any doubts regarding Sarkozy’s motivations. In an article published in Libération, 
Joffrin insisted that the commemoration should not be dismissed as an ephemeral 
political ploy intended to distract the general public, stating “Political calculation? 
Perhaps. But one must judge acts more than intentions. Now, the act is right.”151 
Furthermore, Joffrin too believed that Môquet deserved special consideration and, 
somewhat surprisingly, attacked those who asserted that the commemoration 
compromised historical objectivity due to its reliance on emotion, replying:  
Since when must emotion be banished from the classroom? Whoever has tried to 
give the smallest history course knows that it has the advantage of capturing 
attention before developing, explaining, putting in perspective the historical facts  
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that one wants to teach. Nicolas Sarkozy, as one knows, has not proposed  
replacing history courses with sessions of collective tears.152   
 
Unlike historians and educators who had demanded scholarly objectivity during the loi du 
23 février 2005 controversy, Joffrin proposed that emotion had a place in the classroom 
and served a pedagogical function. Emotion represented an important tool that could 
engage the student’s human sympathies, securing their attention for the subsequent lesson 
in history. However, the concept that history was not a purely scientific and objective 
endeavor did not receive much respect in the months ahead. 
The French Communist Party, on the other hand, expressed their wholehearted 
support for the commemoration. Marie-George Buffet, the National Secretary of the 
French Communist Party, gave his personal support. In an official statement issued on 
May 16, 2007, Buffet declared that the reading of Môquet’s letter would be a strong 
message to send to French youth, especially because  
…this young man was a bearer of patriotism by his participation in the resistance, 
but also because his struggle for human emancipation had a goal; to construct a 
Republic of rights and liberties in a democracy.153 
 
 While the French Communist Party shared Sarkozy’s desire to perpetuate the heroic 
memory of Guy Môquet and the Resistance, its core motivation differed vastly. Buffet’s 
statement revealed an important deviation from Sarkozy’s historical narrative, namely 
that Môquet’s death represented the continued struggle for the fulfillment of human 
emancipation and republican equality instead of patriotic obligation and sacrifice. Unlike 
Sarkozy’s previous descriptions of Môquet, Buffet’s statement suggested that the young 
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communist had worked for the completion of republican goals rather than its 
preservation. Furthermore, it connected Môquet’s internationalist communist sympathies 
with republican values, wedding communism to the national history and effectively 
equating communist internationalism with republican universalism.  
Still, certain communists expressed reservations concerning the commemoration. 
Like historians who had studied Sarkozy’s political campaign, they were suspicious that 
the commemoration would downplay or overlook certain historical details in order to 
transform Môquet into a symbol of the Right. In an article in L’Humanité, Rosa 
Moussaoui accused the Guy Môquet commemoration of conscientiously diminishing 
Môquet’s allegiance to communist internationalism and anti-fascism in order to impose a 
superficial patriotism onto his memory.154 For Moussaoui, Môquet needed to retain his 
internationalism in order to remain communist, and she rejected the patriotic discourse 
grafted onto his memory as antithetical to the fundamental tenets of Marxist philosophy. 
This fear that the commemoration deliberately ignored certain historical facts would 
dominate public discussion over the next few months.   
What support for Guy Môquet’s commemoration that Sarkozy had won in the 
initial months of his presidency sharply diminished once the Ministry of Education issued 
the bulletin that outlined the commemoration’s official proceedings. This bulletin, issued 
August 30th, 2007, provided French educators with a concise outline of the government’s 
expectations. In it, Xavier Darcos, the Minister of Education, proclaimed that the 
principal goal of the commemoration was: 
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 …to remind high school students of the engagement of young men and women  
of all regions and social backgrounds who made the choice to resist, often at the 
cost of their life […] Therefore, all of these young French, their passion clearly 
attached to liberty to the point of sacrificing their own lives to defend the liberty 
of others, constitute a formidable example for today’s youth.155  
 
The purpose of the commemoration had changed very little since Sarkozy had first 
proposed it at the Bois du Boulogne. Reading Guy Môquet’s letter aimed to provide 
students with examples of patriotic service and sacrifice in order to foster feelings similar 
feelings of devotion to the Republic. Still, that did not mean that the commemoration 
would consist of hollow gestures. Instead, the Minister outlined a flexible program that 
could be easily customized. Darcos declared that the letter would be read aloud to 
students in the classroom or in an assembly, which would then be followed by a 
moderated discussion on the history and the memory of World War II.156 What made the 
program so interesting is that the Ministry gave French teachers a significant amount of 
freedom to determine the content and character of their schools’ respective 
commemoration. There was little effort to make the Guy Môquet commemoration 
completely uniform and, in fact, the Ministry encouraged teachers to develop the general 
outline provided by the Ministry of Education and make their own contribution. The 
Ministry bulletin provided them with additional letters written by martyred resistance 
members and suggested that they contact remaining resistance members and 
organizations to request their participation.157 Essentially, the Ministry constructed the 
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event in such a manner that it invited all interested parties invested in the perpetuation 
and transmission of the history of the Resistance to participate. This inclusive character 
reflected the need to assure the participation of a broad cross-section of French society. In 
short, the French State intended the commemoration of Guy Môquet to be an inclusive 
and universal celebration of patriotic virtue throughout France.     
Public responses to Sarkozy’s commemoration of Guy Môquet from the French 
public were mixed, ranging from vivid enthusiasm to skeptical reticence. Former 
Resistance members reacted favorably to the reading of Môquet’s letter in French 
schools. Raymond Aubrac, one of the founders of Libération-Sud, indicated that he was 
pleased to see a president born in the postwar period expressing interest in perpetuating 
the memory of the Resistance.158 However, French historians and educators expressed 
vehement opposition to the proposed commemoration. These individuals, much as the 
debate regarding the loi du 23 février 2005, expressed grave concern that this government 
initiative lacked proper respect for historical complexity and context. Educators who 
taught at the lycée Ango told their students’ parents that the commemoration 
compromised the primary pedagogical duty of the classroom by inserting uncritical 
emotion into a rational discipline. 
Our instruction has nothing to do with an activity that aims to arouse emotion 
without critical distance, without placing evidence, as poignant as it may be, back 
in its historical context […] It is precisely because we distinguish between history 
and memory, practical and moral education, reason and emotion, that we refuse to 
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participate in this commemoration imposed on us without regard to any 
pedagogical consideration.159  
 
They made it quite clear that the introduction of emotion in the classroom ran contrary to 
the atmosphere of neutrality and objectivity required for proper historical study. 
Furthermore, they established a strict and inflexible dichotomy between historical 
instruction and commemoration grounded on rationalism and irrationalism. The 
introduction of emotion and memory, irrational forces, into the classroom threatened to 
undermine the scientific methodology appropriate for the study of history. 
Educators warned that the introduction of these irrational forces would only confuse any 
sense of context regarding the history of the French Resistance. The Syndicat National 
des enseignements de second degré (SNES), a national teacher’s union, published an 
article that anxiously mused over the potential damage that the decontextualized use of 
Môquet’s letter would have on the public understanding of the national past.160 This fear 
reflected the growing concern that Môquet’s letter alone did not provide the necessary 
historical context to frame properly a discussion about the Occupation and the Resistance. 
Pierre Schill, a teacher of history and member of the CVUH, complained that the 
celebration of Guy Môquet as a patriotic martyr made little sense in light of his 
communist loyalties and warned his readers of the dangers of using historical figures for 
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political ends.161 Schill viewed the commemoration as a cynical appropriation of history 
designed to further Sarkozy’s conservative agenda. French educators did not believe that 
their pedagogical responsibilities included the coordination of commemorative exercises 
designed to furnish their students with examples of civic morality. Once again, the fervent 
belief that history needed to be devoid of any manifestation of memory or emotion 
manifested itself in France’s scholarly elite.  
These arguments against the Môquet commemoration contained the general spirit 
of the past opposition to the loi du 23 février 2005: the obligation to preserve professional 
autonomy in the classroom, the need to respect the neutral and objective methodology of 
history, and the imperative to avoid politicized history. However, some educators turned 
to other arguments, revealing a startling contempt for their pupils and the general public. 
In an article appearing in Le Figaro on May 19th, 2007, one anonymous teacher claiming 
to teach in an economically underprivileged junior high school complained that his 
students who read the letter “…would certainly be incapable of comprehending its 
profoundness and even understanding the words.”162 Students, he said, would be better 
served by practical and useful instruction rather than government commemorations.163 
Although the anonymous teacher raised relevant concerns over the ability of students to 
understand and appreciate the historical and moral significance of the letter, this skeptical 
attitude regarding the general public’s capacity to think historically and interact with that 
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history grew to scandalous proportions. Others expressed considerable dismay at their 
growing inability to control public discussions of national history. Thierry Desanti, a 
history teacher, expressed shock that Guy Môquet’s letter had been read at the rugby 
match between France and Argentina that September, darkly conjecturing at its 
implications.164 Paranoid that the French government was consciously trying to 
undermine the integrity of their profession and horrified by unsupervised public 
expressions of memory, French educators raised opposition to a hysterical pitch. In spite 
of the benevolent intentions of French educators, the Môquet commemoration revealed a 
strain of latent arrogance and contempt for the general public. 
How to explain this maelstrom of anger, arrogance, and resentment on the part of 
French educators? Much of the anger directed at Sarkozy and the government appeared to 
stem from the President’s Lettre Aux Éducateurs, which outlined his vision of republican 
education and intended reforms for the educational system.165 Certainly, French teachers 
had responded negatively to the government’s involvement in the formation of course 
curriculum during the loi du 23 février 2005 and, thus, it is unsurprising that Sarkozy’s 
intrusion provoked alarm and harsh responses. However, Sarkozy’s apparent desire to 
revise the classroom’s structure as well as its curriculum made his intrusion appear much 
more threatening. Many teachers viewed the proposed reforms as a direct threat to their 
livelihoods. The SNES particularly attacked his proposal to cut back on the number of 
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teachers in the classroom and reduce school hours.166 Still, shallow self-interest alone did 
not motivate the opposition. The SNES found these reforms inconsistent with the shared 
goal of making French schools more inclusive and integrate all students into the social 
body of the Republic. The organization attacked Sarkozy for failing to address the critical 
issue of continued social inequality in French education and his proposed elimination of 
the carte scolaire167, a social program that allowed French parents to request specific 
schools for their children based on their physical and educational needs.168 Overall, 
educators conflated the President’s commemoration and proposed reforms as the herald 
of a vast institutional revision that directly threatened their profession and careers. In 
response, the SNES passed a motion on September 12th, 2007, that called on every 
teacher to protest the commemoration of Guy Môquet and resist any official pressures to 
participate.169   
Some French historians also began to voice their misgivings. The CVUH, already 
wary of Sarkozy’s use of French history in his campaign rhetoric, expressed grave 
reservations about the commemoration of Guy Môquet in French schools. Much like their 
peers in secondary education, these historians feared that the commemoration did not 
provide adequate information or historical context necessary for fully understanding the 
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Occupation and Resistance. They were particularly worried about the simplification of 
Môquet’s role in the history of the Occupation and the subsequent reduction of that entire 
history to a single theme of sacrifice.170 Furthermore, the CVUH accused the President of 
manipulating the life of Guy Môquet for political ends, particularly in regard to the 
evacuation of much of the letter’s historical context from the commemoration. According 
to the historians, Guy Môquet’s letter alone did not sufficiently convey the historical 
complexities that surrounded his life and death.171 Focusing on the letter’s contents 
avoided more difficult and troubling questions about the French struggle and complicity 
with the Occupation. However, for all their demands for objectivity, historians could not 
resist the urge to draw on history for support. For example, Laurence De Cock-Pierrepont 
mused that the values that Sarkozy hoped to instill in French youth had a disturbing 
resonance with those of Vichy: Famille, Travail, Patrie.172 His observation had the 
implicit aim of subverting the Sarkozy’s commemoration by comparing the President and 
his government to the enemies of the French Republic and Resistance. Ironically, 
Sarkozy’s efforts to revive French youth’s attachment to the Republic had only reopened 
old wounds that still lingered in national memory.   
D. The Commemoration Appears to Fall Apart 
 This drama played out bitterly in the weeks prior to the commemoration. By the 
fall of 2007, the French Left had abandoned its earlier enthusiasm for the project. The 
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Communists were outraged that Sarkozy and the Ministry of Education had decided to 
play down the communist allegiances of Môquet and the twenty-six others executed 
alongside him. In a statement issued on October 16th, Communist Party spokesman 
Olivier Dartigolles issued a strong condemnation of Minister Darcos, who had 
“…transformed the communist militants into ‘companions’.”173 The Communist Party 
deeply resented the depoliticization of these young men. The political affiliation of Guy 
Môquet and his fellows represented an essential part of communist memory and their 
vision of the struggle to obtain a Republic. Thus, the Party had a vested interest in the 
preservation of Guy Môquet’s memory as a communist agitator and it was not willing to 
idly allow the Right to efface that memory.  
The Right came to the defense of their president’s project, armed with a familiar 
embittered narrative. Ivan Rioufol, a conservative writer and essayist, scathingly 
condemned French teachers and communists for transforming the Môquet 
commemoration into a platform to launch a political attack on Sarkozy. In an article in Le 
Figaro, Rioufol accused French teachers of placing multicultural narratives above the 
national narrative at a time where increased immigration required the integration of these 
new arrivals into the national community.174 Rioufol’s argument echoed Michelle’s 
Tabarot’s passionate denunciation of French teachers and the Left during the loi du 23 
février 2005 controversy. Their apparent refusal to participate in the construction of a 
shared history only weakened the Republic’s ability to inspire a feeling of belonging 
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amongst its citizens. Counteraccusations of bias and historical myopia also occurred. 
Rioufol argued that the Communist Party’s self-righteous objections to the government’s 
commemoration of Guy Môquet were made in bad faith. He pointed out that the 
Communists’ vision of Môquet as a hero of the French Communist Party made little 
sense because Môquet had participated in resistance activities against the Communist 
Party’s orders, as its superiors were nominally allied with the Germans.175 Instead of 
fostering national unity and consensus, the Guy Môquet commemoration had resurrected 
old feuds and divided France over who had truly fought for the Republic. 
 With this hysteria taking place, it is little surprise that the French government 
made significant concessions in order to salvage the commemoration and diminish public 
hostility. In spite of fervent objection from some officials within the French government, 
Xavier Darcos declared that the government had not intended to and would not force 
teachers to read the letter, reiterating that teachers had the authority to decide for 
themselves how to participate.176 These assurances may have been responsible for the 
surprising level of participation in schools across France. According to the French 
government, roughly 93% of French schools participated in the reading of Guy Môquet’s 
letter.177 However, this statistic does not reveal how French teachers conducted the 
commemoration. Certain teachers may very well have used the reading of the letter to 
provide a more contextualized history of the Resistance or illustrate how history can be 
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politicized, in spite of the admonition of their peers to refusal to participate.178 
Unfortunately, there is little way to determine easily how many teachers actually 
participated in the event and what forms the commemoration took on in the classroom.  
E. Why the Controversy? 
 Why did the commemorative reading of Guy Môquet become so controversial? 
Several factors contributed to the explosive response to Sarkozy’s commemoration. First 
of all, the circumstances that concluded the controversy of the loi du 23 février 2005 had 
left critical issues unresolved, namely the government’s right to participate in the making 
of history. Furthermore, the loi du 23 février 2005 had encouraged educators and 
historians to organize and be wary of any state attempt to revise or promote particular 
narratives in national history. Without this critical past experience, I do not believe that 
the opposition to the Môquet commemoration would have been able to present a unified 
front. Furthermore, the political passions still boiling in the wake of a fierce presidential 
election also made opposition so fierce. Sarkozy’s victory had emboldened him to 
implement zealously his program and encouraged the vanquished Left to oppose anything 
that the new President and his party proposed. The personality and political beliefs of the 
French president also fed his opponents. Sarkozy’s political career had been built on the 
principles of social and cultural order, which encouraged his opponents to interpret the 
commemoration of Guy Môquet as the beginning of an unprecedented wave of 
conservative reform that needed to be opposed. The alienation of French teachers and 
Communists likely made the controversy unavoidable. If the political stakes had not 
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seemed so high, the reading of Guy Môquet’s letter would likely have not produced such 
stormy debate. 
 The methodological sensitivities of French historians and educators also posed a 
formidable obstacle to the commemoration. These individuals, trained to think critically 
as historians, found themselves discomforted by the intrusion of an emotionally charged 
document into the classroom. They once again insisted that history was a neutral and 
objective discipline that demanded distance from emotion. This emotional approach to 
history, historians and educators argued, caused the public to miss the various contexts 
surrounding Guy Môquet’s life and death. The repeated demand for complexity and 
context echoed the previous demands made during the loi du 23 février 2005 debates. 
Only that complex history could furnish the diverse citizenry of France with a common 
national past. Lastly, rumors of reform enflamed educators’ fears that their professional 
would be subordinated to the whims of the executive. Their hysterical claims of public 
ignorance and incompetence reflected the desperate desire to justify their existence in 
French society. Without them, there would be no guardians against the French State’s 
politicization of the national past.  
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CHAPTER 5 
AN (OVER?)ABUNDANCE OF MEMORY 
One of my French colleagues, when discussing the differences between the United 
States and France, readily declared that my country lacked history or, more specifically, a 
sensitivity for history. Although this stereotype of the American people may be 
questioned, this expression of French sensitivity to history demonstrates the extent to 
which the past permeates the daily activities of French society. Indeed, France appears 
unable to avoid regular confrontations with the traumatic episodes of its national past, be 
it the commemoration of the rafle du Vél d’Hiv, the belated trials of Maurice Papon and 
Paul Touvier, the lois Gayssot, Taubira and the loi du 23 février 2005, the lawsuit 
launched against historian Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, or the booing of Franco-Algerian 
youth at the Marseillaise. Even the bicentennial of the French Revolution, intended to be 
a celebration of the Republic’s triumph, could not escape the shadows cast by the Terror 
and the vicious civil war in the Vendée.179 How to explain these unremitting 
manifestations of traumatic memories in France? Henry Rousso has suggested that the 
occasional outbursts of scandal and aggrieved memories are the product of the tensions, 
contradictions, and disparities over how various communities have chosen to structure 
their memories180. However, this model does not satisfactorily explain why these 
memories continue to surface so disruptively in public consciousness. This limitation 
becomes even more frustrating due to the fact that the majority of the French population 
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today has little direct experience with its most contentious historical moments, be it the 
Revolution, the Occupation or decolonization. How to explain this alleged obsession with 
the past, even when the living memory of that past is gone or slowly fading into oblivion? 
A. Neurosis and French History: A Satisfying Conceptual Model? 
Henry Rousso, the father of the “neurosis” thesis of French memory, has 
suggested that France’s obsessive relationship with the past is the result of unresolved 
social tensions and grievances that have simmered since the épuration’s failure to provide 
closure to the tumultuous experience of Vichy and the Occupation.181 The framework of 
Rousso’s thesis, the unsuccessful épuration, the band-aid of Gaullist Resistance fixed 
onto national memory, and the ultimate reopening of painful memories in the 1970’s, 
certainly provides the historian an appealing model. David Schalk’s article on the alleged 
“Algerian symptom” and France’s efforts to overcome its self-imposed silence on the 
Algerian War further reinforces this conceptualization of neurotic French memory.182 
This malleable definition of neurotic memory and trauma certainly provides the historian 
with a narrative capable of linking much of France’s social divisions back to these 
periods. An impressive number of controversial moments, be it François Mitterand’s 
failure to acknowledge the crimes of Vichy or the violent protests of the harkis in the 
1970’s, fit surprisingly well into this model of unresolved trauma, self-flagellation, and 
repentance.  
However, the presence of contested memories does not necessarily indicate that 
these competing memories will always be anathema to each other. The function of 
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collective memory is to ensure the containment and neutralization of any deviant 
narratives that threaten to undermine communal cohesiveness. This process of 
containment seeks to integrate these divisive memories into the national narrative. For 
example, French conservative and centrist politicians framed the rapatriés’ historical 
contribution to the Republic in such a way to diminish their perceived attachment to an 
alien community and integrate them back into the Republic. This synthetic character of 
collective memory also does not possess an inherent conservative character. Both the 
French Right and Left wished to construct a shared history for its citizens that respected 
their diverse experiences. Issues over what histories to include, not the histories 
themselves, precipitated disagreement amongst French politicians and the general public.   
This negotiation between political and social communities over control of the 
national past has existed in France long before the traumas instilled by Vichy and 
decolonization. Robert Gildea’s voluminous study of numerous communities 
appropriating the national past as a means to describe and explain contemporary political 
and social features in French society demonstrated that this process is not unique to the 
twentieth century. The various uses of the French national past to convey specific values- 
be they duty, obligation, sacrifice, and national pride or guilt, contrition, repentance, and 
multiculturalism- revealed that the loi du 23 février 2005 and the Guy Môquet 
Commemoration belonged to a tradition far broader than that of the “Vichy Syndrome.” 
The conceptual model of French memory as an obsessive neurosis may very well need 
substantial revision. Instead of emphasizing the repetitive and divisive consequences of 
contested memory, French encounters with the past should be reconceptualized as a long-
established and healthy discourse.  
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I confess that I too have felt the allure to conform to Rousso’s model of French 
memory. The episodic reemergence of troubled memories and the subsequent debate over 
their place in the national past does resemble neurosis: the unpredictable and sometimes 
violent swings between lucidity and irrationality. Nevertheless, this model may have done 
more to hinder scholarly understanding of the function of memory in modern society. The 
presentation of French memory as a neurosis implies that, although that illness may be 
treated, France will forever be prone to debilitating paroxysms of remembrance. This 
approach stymies the historian’s ability to recognize new developments in the practices of 
French remembrance because it presupposes a defined set of behaviors. Continued 
adherence ensures the indefinite extension of this metaphor, which threatens to trivialize 
the study of French memory into a permanent couch session. Furthermore, its use 
suggests that present and, by extension, past interactions with the French national past 
reveal an unhealthy fixation. There is little room to consider the possibility that these 
encounters, no matter how passionate and divisive they may be, represent a nation’s 
healthy effort to master its past. 
Do the loi du 23 février 2005 and the Guy Môquet commemoration reinforce or 
complicate the neurosis thesis? At first glance, they appear to fit in well with Rousso’s 
thesis. Both events possessed similar motivations. Both the loi du 23 février 2005 and the 
Guy Môquet commemoration aimed to impose an inclusive vision of the national past 
onto the national consciousness for the purposes of fostering feelings of national 
attachment. In this sense, they are much like the Gaullist “resistenticialist” described by 
Rousso, which sought to bind French society back together in the wake of the 
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Occupation. Furthermore, both these events, again like De Gaulle’s myth of universal 
resistance, broke down into a fierce contestation of the national past.  
At this point, one may be tempted to situate the loi du 23 février 2005 and the Guy 
Môquet commemoration within the context of a “Vichy Syndrome” or “Algerian 
Syndrome,” but that would be hasty. Consider that these two events took place after a 
lengthy process of uncovering traumatic memories. The rediscovery of Jewish memory 
and the Holocaust in the 1970’s, the startling rediscovery of Vichy’s complicity with the 
German Occupiers, the public admission of torture in Algeria, the angry reassertion of 
harkis memory and dignity, and the proliferation of media dedicated to these subjects 
compelled France to acknowledge its past. France’s recognition of its dark past 
encouraged the Republic to undertake an active campaign to acknowledge past crimes 
and provided mechanisms to ensure the continued recognition of that past. The loi du 23 
février 2005 aimed to indemnify the rapatriés and preserve their memory by the means of 
public education. The law simultaneously aimed to recognize and neutralize traumatic 
memory through material reparation and the national assumption of that traumatic past. 
The trauma of decolonization no longer belonged to the rapatrié or harkis; it belonged to 
the nation. Similarly, the Guy Môquet commemoration sought to reframe Môquet, a 
communist agitator, as a French nationalist and patriot. These two events recognized the 
traumas of the Occupation and decolonization and, more important, integrated these 
narratives into the nation’s collective memory. Neither event saw a serious denial of the 
terrible human costs of colonization/decolonization or the moral compromises associated 
with the Occupation. Instead, the French Republic sought to integrate all divisive and 
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competing narratives into a unified meta-narrative, favoring certain memories over 
others.  
The controversy that surrounded the loi du 23 février 2005 and the Guy Môquet 
commemoration, in reality, dealt much less with the desired acknowledgment of past 
crimes and much more with which visions of the national past to honor. The loi du 23 
février 2005 affair brought the French Right and Left into a debate over the alleged 
benefits of colonization and colonial rule. The Guy Môquet commemoration once again 
brought the French Right and Left to compete for the heart and soul of the Resistance. 
There were no new discoveries of repressed traumas or the unveiling of new historical 
evidence that provoked and fueled these debates. Rather, the French Republic and its 
citizens found themselves engaged in a general debate over which narratives would be 
incorporated into the national past and which would be silenced.  
B. Demanding Rationality: French Historians’ Discomfort With Memory 
The controversy surrounding the loi du 23 février 2005 and Guy Môquet 
commemoration also revealed the assumption of many French historians that the study of 
the past was a rational endeavor. The continued insistence on the irrational character of 
memory motivated their denial that it belonged in a serious discussion of national history.  
However, this belief that the French Republic and its citizens are obsessed with a 
traumatic past risks the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Henry Rousso and Éric 
Conan proposed in their recent book, Vichy: An Ever-present Past, that media 
sensationalism and the demands for “proper” remembrance of the French past by 
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militants have caused the substantial distortion and falsification of French history.183 Any 
minor scandal or advocacy group that commanded media attention recycled and revived 
this introspective drama of French culpability and contrition. To be sure, the 
commercialization of traumatic memories for mass consumption has made this type of 
discourse profitable. However, historians have exhibited mounting discomfort at this 
whirlwind. The manifest of the CVUH rejected the current style of public engagement 
with the past, accusing the French state and media of creating a public atmosphere in 
which an unhealthy comparison and competition amongst aggrieved communities had 
triumphed over the critical analysis of the past.184 The introduction of value judgments 
and morality violated the fundamental principles of historical research; neutrality and 
objectivity. This inability to maintain an emotional detachment in discussing its past 
provoked the morbid fascination with victimization, which had dire repercussions for the 
historical clarity and truth.185   
The Liberté pour l’histoire movement also condemned the intrusion of 
contemporary moral sensibilities into matters of the past. Like the CVUH, Liberté pour 
l’histoire resisted the public’s infatuation with trauma and victimization. However, this 
organization articulated a more adamant rejection of the French State’s imposition of an 
official history, claiming that this approach still involved making moral judgments on the 
past. It vehemently dismissed this use of history, stating that “(t)he historian does not 
plaque the sensibilities of today onto past ideological schemas nor introduce them into the 
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events of the past […] History is not an object of the law.”186 In this sense, the national 
past did not belong to the public or the State. To these two distinct advocacy groups, 
history belonged to the historian and memory only represented a facet of history.  
Within this robust reclamation of history, there existed a tense contradiction. 
There remained a visible tension between the desire to remain detached from public 
debate and the other desire to rescue history from irresponsible legislation and alleviate 
historical distortion in public discourse. Two polar conceptions of the historian’s role in 
society, the detached observer and the active instructor, struggled for dominance. How 
exactly did historians expect to “reclaim” history without a direct engagement with the 
general public? Furthermore, how should the historian define the boundaries of memory 
and history? French historians involved in these two controversies expressed their belief 
that memory represented only the raw material of history, the primitive foundation of the 
historian’s scientific investigation of the past.187 Memory tells only a part of the story, 
they say, and it cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of past events. This may be true, 
but this definition of memory as a pale simulacrum expresses too much disregard for 
memory. The possibility of a dialogue with the French public is impossible without a 
genuine respect for the memories that it possesses. Furthermore, this definition 
underestimates the emotional power of memory. Historians, I fear, have little real reason 
to expect that a presentation of a complex narrative of the past will obliterate the 
cherished memories found in the hearts and minds of the general public.   
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Let us set aside French historians’ conflicted position on memory and focus on 
their resistance to the lois mémorielles and recent commemorations. The historians of the 
CVUH and the Liberté pour l’histoire movements did not object to the French State’s 
commemoration of the national past. Both agreed that that is a normal function of the 
modern nation-state. However, these historians took issue with the Republic’s efforts to 
impose legally an official history that delineated appropriate narratives and criminalized 
deviating ones. This practice, they warned, could have dire consequences for the 
functioning of French democracy. Jean-Pierre Azéma expressed considerable 
apprehension in an interview with Libération that these lois mémorielles represented a 
system of political patronage that encouraged politicians to recognize officially the 
memories of valuable electorates in exchange for support.188 The use of legislated history 
to further political careers appeared to trivialize the past and reduce its study to the public 
referendum and the legislator’s pen. Moreover, this politicization of history further 
distorted the historical record by explicitly endorsing one narrative on the basis of 
political expediency instead of scholarly merit. Éric Conan noted that the loi Taubira 
established the trans-Atlantic slave trade as a crime against humanity at the exclusion of 
the African-Arab slave trades.189 A law that made an exclusive moral judgment on the 
practice against slavery in the West misrepresented the historical record, which indicated 
that slavery had been practiced elsewhere in history. This exclusive condemnation tacitly 
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supported scholarship that possessed considerable anachronisms and unjustified 
comparisons. Consider the book Le Crime de Napoleon,190 which accused Napoleon of 
allegedly using poison gas attacks on revolting Haitian slaves and concluded that the 
Corsican was the ideological predecessor of Hitler. Conan expressed considerable 
trepidation at this comparison, stating that it made an impossible connection between the 
treatment of revolting Haitian slaves and the planned, industrial extermination of 
European Jews. To this end, he questioned what use the application of contemporary 
terminology, “crime against humanity,” served in historical studies.191 The application of 
contemporary terminology and values to history could easily degenerate the quality of 
scholarship.  
Aside from obvious concerns over the proliferation of anachronism in scholarly 
and public knowledge, historians found other reasons to oppose the lois mémorielles. The 
2005 lawsuit filed against historian Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau for his denial that the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade was a crime against humanity appeared to threaten intellectual 
freedom in France. French historians realized that their books could be potentially 
deemed criminal and their persons brought to trial if their work did not adhere to the 
history endorsed by French law. Of course, the loi Gayssot had brought historians to trial 
before this. Robert Faurisson, the notorious Holocaust denier and anti-Semite, had been 
tried and convicted of hate-speech in his writings. However, this case demonstrated that 
current and future lois mémorielles, working in conjunction with each other, could be 
used to silence or coerce legitimate historians. Some believed that the Republic stood on 
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the verge of a new age of censorship based on official historical narratives endorsed by 
the French State.192 The intrusion of memory and legislated history into historical 
scholarship appeared to undermine scholarly autonomy and coerce scholars to comply 
with whichever community had successfully won recognition from the Republic. 
The fact that this contest of legislated and non-legislated memories took place 
within the spatial domain of the classroom heightened the stakes each party was playing 
for. Education, as mentioned earlier, represented one of the fundamental elements of 
republican society. Since the Third Republic, the French State has vigorously used the 
classroom to inculcate French youth with democratic and secular values favorable to 
preservation of the Republic. Ensuring the next generation’s loyalty to those values 
increases the chances of republican society’s perpetuation into the future. However, the 
classroom has never been the private domain of the Republic. Other communities too 
have an interest in public education and, at times, have successfully overridden the 
French State’s prerogatives. Conservative, Catholic, Jewish, pro-colonial, and anti-
colonial communities have all sought to use the classroom as a means of remaking the 
past in their own image in order to influence the present. French historians and educators, 
much to the chagrin of these communities, have come to act as a mediator amongst these 
competing communities. Their sincere belief in laïcité has led them to frame the strict 
neutrality espoused by their professions as the first defense of the Republic and its youth 
against visions of the past that seek to stymie free thought.      
This rejection of historical revisionism by many French historians and educators 
helps to explain their curt rejection of both political parties’ narratives of France’s past 
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during these two events. They realized that these events both represented official meta-
narratives that simplified history and overlooked complexity.193 Although they were by 
no means friendly to the Right’s efforts to impose officially their vision of French history 
onto the nation, French historians had no desire to embrace the Left’s vision either. 
Above all, they aimed to restore the Republic’s neutrality in historical matters. But how 
was this restoration of neutrality to be achieved? In short, this would be accomplished by 
the return to traditional republican values. Demands that objectivity and neutrality be 
restored to the national discussion of the past closely resembled the republican concept of 
laïcité. Therefore, the routine calls for a return to an objective and neutral discussion on 
national history conformed to professional and republican sympathies.  
Of course, one could and correctly argue that history, unlike science, requires an 
interpretation of information and artifacts that represent the product of human virtues, 
vices, sympathies, and emotions. Furthermore, the historian’s claims to objectivity seem 
hollow, especially in this case where they are criticizing their society’s use of the past. 
Therefore, this emphasis on neutrality and objectivity must be taken with a grain of salt. 
These values that historians aspire to embody cannot be reasonably obtained due to their 
individual experiences and the concerted pressures of the multiple communities that they 
inhabit. These individuals, in reality, are as much a part of the many communities that 
comprises the nation of France. The regular insistence that their professional 
methodologies render them alone competent to assess and evaluate the national past thus 
rings somewhat false, particularly when one considers their response to the reading of 
Guy Môquet’s letter at the opening game of the 2007 rugby tournament. French historians 
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may be correct in their assessment that greater objectivity needs to be restored in the 
public discourse regarding the national past. However, professional training alone does 
not bestow them complete control over the national past. If experience alone does not 
provide ample foundation for an individual’s claim to define his past, than why should 
“neutral” knowledge alone? 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Is a more “objective” history of France possible? Can the nation overcome its 
fixation on the traumatic pasts of the Occupation and decolonization? Can the French 
overcome their allegedly neurotic obsession with the past? I believe that we are 
witnessing that process taking place today. The silence and repression of these pasts have 
given way to a serious and sometimes contentious public discourse about the character of 
France’s national history and its meaning for the present. The apparent rejection of 
consensus history by French politicians and historians and their endorsement of a 
complex and pluralist history, as different as their definitions may be, indicate that the 
Republic is attempting to make space available for these multiple historical narratives. 
The existence of these multiple histories within French society could very well act to 
achieve national goals of coexistence and repentance without necessarily compromising 
its citizens’ loyalty, as some of its detractors may argue. This outcome may be the end of 
the “Vichy Syndrome” or “Algeria Syndrome” in France.  
Still, some healthy skepticism must be held for this potential outcome. In spite of 
the insistence of French politicians and historians that the presence of multiple histories 
will help to alleviate public competitions of memory, these repeated claims say very little 
about the practical means of how this goal will be accomplished. This proves especially 
true in the case of the CVUH. These historians give little consideration to the possibility 
that the general public may not have the time or energy necessary to master the historical 
evidence and methodology necessary for acknowledging and appreciating history’s 
complexities. The demands of everyday living may not afford the public the proper 
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conditions to develop the historical sensibility enjoyed by the historian. Furthermore, the 
assumption that the common citizen will conform to the instruction provided by either the 
politician or the historian appears somewhat naïve. The general public, especially French 
students, ultimately will be the arbiters of the national past. The Republic’s citizens will 
determine the character of the national past. Disruptive eruptions of repressed memories 
and sensationalized media hype may very well be coming to an end. Now, French 
historians must be willing to trust their fellow citizens and allow them to construct that 
shared history together. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
THE TRANSLATED ORIGINAL LOI DU FÉVRIER 2005 
 
JORF # 46, February 23 20005, Page 3128 
Text # 2 
 
Law 2005-158 February 23, 2005 Bearing on the Nation’s Recognition and Aid To 
French Repatriates. 
 
NOR: DEFX0300218L 
 
The National Assembly and the Senate have adopted, 
The President of the Republic proclaims the law whose content reads: 
 
Article 1 
 
The Nation expresses its recognition of the women and men who participated in the work 
accomplished by France in the former départements of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Indochina, as well as territories once under French sovereignty. 
 
It recognizes the suffering experienced and the sacrifices endured by the Repatriates, the 
former members of cooperative and assimilated forces, the vanished and civilian and 
military victims of events linked to the process of independence of these former 
départements and territories, and gives to them, as well as their families, our solemn 
respect. 
 
Article 2 
 
The Nation includes the Repatriates of North Africa, disappeared persons, and civilian 
victims of the massacres or violent acts committed during the Algerian War and after 
March 19, 1962 in violation of the Evian Accords, as well as the civilian victims of 
combat in Tunisia and Morocco, in the homage rendered on December 5 to combatants 
who died for France in North Africa. 
 
Article 3 
 
A foundation for the memory of the Algerian War and combat in Morocco and Tunisia is 
created, with the State’s support. The conditions of the creation of this foundation will be 
fixed by the decree of the Conseil d’État. 
 
Article 4 
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University research programs will accord to the history of France’s presence overseas, 
especially in North Africa, the place that it deserves. 
 
Scholarly programs will recognize in particular the positive role of France’s presence 
overseas, especially in North Africa, and accord to the history and sacrifices of French 
combatants born of these territories the rightful place they are entitled to. 
 
Cooperation permitting the gathering of oral and written sources available in France and 
abroad is encouraged. 
 
Article 5 
 
Are Forbidden: 
 
All injury or defamation committed against a person or group of people because of their 
true or alleged status as harkis, former members of cooperating and assimilated forces; 
 
All apologia for the crimes committed against the harkis and the former members of 
cooperating and assimilated forces after the Evian Accords. 
 
The State assures the enforcement of this law. 
 
Article 6 
 
I. The recipients of the benefits of recognition mentioned by Article 67 of the Law for 
Rectified Finances of 2002(#2002-1576 December 30, 2002) can opt by choice: 
  
- maintaining benefits whose annual rate will be raised by 2,800 euros, 
beginning January 1st, 2005 
- maintaining benefits at the rate put in place during January 1st, 2004 and the 
payment of 20,000 euros. 
- Payment, in place of benefits, of 30,000 euros. 
 
In case of payment, benefits will be given at the rate established on January 1st, 2004 until 
the payment is made. As a safeguard, during the interim period, benefits will be paid at 
the same rate. 
 
In the case of the death of a former veteran and his surviving partner or former partner at 
the time of this law’s passing, as long as they satisfy the conditions fixed by Article 2 of 
Law 94-488, June 11, 1994 concerning repatriated veterans or victims of the Algerian 
conflict, a grant will be distributed in equal shares among their children if they possess 
French citizenship and live within France or a European territory as of January 1st, 2004. 
 
Persons recognized as wards of the state, orphans, of French nationality and living within 
the France or a state in the European community by January 1st, 2004, whose parents 
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served as members of harkis forces, not discussed in the previous paragraph, will receive 
a grant of 20,000 euros, which will be split into equal parts to children issuing from the 
same union. 
 
The means of application for this article, and notably the delay caused by the choice of 
option as well as the distribution of payments, taking into account the age of the 
beneficiaries, will be fixed by decree by the Conseil d’Etat. 
 
II. The above indemnities paid are not liable to seizure and do not constitute taxable 
revenue for local governments or the State. 
 
Article 7 
 
I. In Articles 7,8, and 9 of Law 94-448 of June 11, 2004 Concerning Repatriates, Veterans 
of the Cooperative and Assimilated Forces, or Victims of Captivity in Algeria, the date 
“December 31, 2004” is replaced by “December 31, 20009”. 
 
II. The second paragraph of Article 7 of the same law is replaced by the two following 
revised paragraphs: 
 
“This aid awarded to the previously mentioned people destined to be property owners 
individually or with their children on the condition that they live together on the property 
acquired.” 
 
“It is added to every other form of aid outlined by the Construction and Housing Code.” 
 
III. In the first paragraph of Article 9 of the same law, the words “achieved before January 
1, 1994” will be replaced by “achieved before January 1, 2005.” 
 
Article 8 
 
After the seventh paragraph of Article L. 302-5 of the Construction and Housing Code, a 
paragraph will be inserted, stating: 
 
“are considered as rented housing, in the sense of the third paragraph, those financed by 
the State or local collectivities occupied for free, excepting housing for functionnaires, or 
given or acquired by veterans thanks to a subvention made by the State on behalf of the 
indemnity law.” 
Article 9 
 
By dispensation at fixed terms to benefit the grant and specific aids for lodging 
mentioned by Article 6 and 7, the minister charged with the repatriates accords the 
benefits of these funds to former harkis and veterans of the cooperative and assimilated 
forces who served in Algeria, to their widows and orphans, repatriates, age 60 and above, 
who can prove a continued domicile in France or in another member state of the 
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European Community since January 1, 1973 and who acquired French nationality before 
January 1, 1995. 
 
This request for dispensation will be presented within a year following the publication of 
the decree of the application of this article. 
 
Article 10 
 
The children of persons mentioned in the aforementioned Article 6, Law 94-488 of June 
11 1994, eligible for national scholarships, can receive aid, of which the amount and 
means of distribution will be defined by decree. 
 
Article 11 
 
The Government will transmit to Parliament a report appraising the situation of former 
cooperative soldiers’ children one year after the enactment of this law and will take stock 
of the needs of this population in terms of education, employment, and housing. 
 
Article 12 
 
I. Will be restored to the beneficiaries of the indemnities or, in case of decease, to those 
having rights to the sums debited on the indemnities by the National Agency for the 
Indemnisation of Overseas French assigned by the partial or total reimbursement of goods 
thanks to the following legislation: 
 
1) Article 46 of the Law 70-632 of July 15, 1970 relative to the national aid and 
indemnisation of French dispossessed of their goods held in territories previously 
under French sovereignty, protection, or tutelage of the French State.  
 
2) The third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of Article 3 of Law 78-1 of January 2, 
1978 relative to the indemnisation of Overseas French Repatriates dispossessed of 
their goods. 
 
II. Are also restored to persons having benefited of an indemnisation in application of 
Article 2 of Law 87-549 of July 16, 1987 relative to the regulation of the indemnisation of 
the Repatriates or to those having rights to debited sums, in reimbursement of 
professional goods, to the brute definitive aid accorded by agricultural goods in the cadre 
of Franco-Tunisian protocols of October 13, 1960 and March 2 1963. 
 
III. The restorations mentioned in I and II cannot be considered taxable by the State or 
local collectivities. They do not actively enter into the inheritance of beneficiaries in 
regards to the right of mutation after death. 
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IV. A decree in the Conseil d’Etat will fix the conditions of application of the present 
article, notably the methods of payment of the sums to be restored as well as a payment 
schedule taking into account the age of the beneficiaries. 
 
V. Requests for restitution are to be  presented within two years from the day of the 
publication of the decree mentioned in IV. 
 
Article 13 
 
Those who can request a set indemnisation after the date of the present law are person of 
French nationality, who, in direct relation with the events in Algeria during the period of 
October 15, 1954 to July 3, 1962, were the object of condemnations or sanctions that 
have been amnestied, administrative measures of expulsion, internment or house arrest, 
whose professional activity was ended by these events, and who do and not figure among 
the beneficiaries mentioned in Article 1 of Law 82-1021 December 3, 1982 relative to the 
regulation of certain conditions resulting from the events of North Africa, the War in 
Indochina, or the Second World War. 
 
The indemnity mentioned in the previous paragraph cannot be taxed by the State or local 
collectivities.  
 
A decree by the Conseil d’Etat will determine the amount of this indemnity, notably 
taking into account the duration of justified inactivity as well as the means of payment for 
these benefits. 
 
This request for indemnity will be presented within a year following the publication of the 
decree applying this article. 
 
The present law will be executed as a State law. 
 
Written in Paris, February 23, 2005 
 
Jacques Chirac 
 
By President of the Republic 
 
The Prime Minister, 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin 
 
The Minister of National Education, Higher Education, and Research, 
François Fillon 
 
Minister of Defense, 
Michèle Alliot-Marie 
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Minister of the Economy, Finances, and Industry, 
Hervé Gaymard 
 
Minister of the Budget, Bugetary Reform, and Government Spokesman, 
Jean-François Copé 
 
Minister of Veterans’ Affairs 
Hamlaoui Mékachéra 
 
(1) Preparatory Works 
 
National Assembly 
Project Law 1499; 
 
Christian Kert’s Report, made on behalf of the Commission of Cultural Affairs, #1660; 
 
Discussion and Adoption of June 11 2004. 
 
Senate: 
 
Project of Law, adopted by the National Assembly, #356 (2003-2004); 
 
Alain Gournac’s Report, on behalf of the Commission for Social Affairs, # 104 (2004-
2005); 
 
Discussion and Adoption December 16, 2004. 
 
National Assembly: 
 
Project of Law, modified by the Senate, #1994; 
 
Christian Kert’s Report, on behalf of the Commission of Cultural Affairs, #1999; 
 
Discussion and Adoption, February 10, 2005. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
GUY MÔQUET’S LETTER194 
 
My darling Mummy, my adored brother, my much loved Daddy, I am going to 
die! What I ask of you, especially you Mummy, is to be brave. I am, and I want to be, as 
brave as all those who have gone before me. Of course, I would have preferred to live. 
But what I wish with all my heart is that my death serves a purpose. I didn’t have time to 
embrace Jean. I embraced my two brothers Roger and Rino (1). As for my real brother, I 
cannot embrace him, alas! I hope all my clothes will be sent back to you. They might be 
of use to Serge, I trust he will be proud to wear them one day. To you, my Daddy to 
whom I have given many worries, as well as to my Mummy, I say goodbye for the last 
time. Know that I did my best to follow the path that you laid out for me. A last adieu to 
all my friends, to my brother whom I love very much. May he study hard to become a 
man later on. Seventeen and a half years, my life has been short, I have no regrets, if only 
that of leaving you all. I am going to die with Tintin, Michels. Mummy, what I ask you, 
what I want you to promise me, is to be brave and to overcome your sorrow. I cannot put 
any more. I am leaving you all, Mummy, Serge, Daddy, I embrace you with all my child’s 
heart. Be brave! Your Guy who loves you. 
 
(1) His Brothers in Arms. 
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